Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 1 - Evidence - March 14, 2001
OTTAWA, Wednesday, March 14, 2001
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 3:30 p.m. to examine and report on emerging political, social, economic and security developments in Russia and Ukraine; Canada's policy and interests in the region; and other related matters.
Senator Peter A. Stollery (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Senators, I have been informed that we need a motion for the cameras to proceed.
Senator Bolduc: I so move.
Senator Corbin: May I ask a question?
The Chairman: Yes.
Senator Corbin: Will any of this be used at any time anywhere?
The Chairman: On CPAC, I believe. The idea is that we should like to have our proceedings televised. It would be useful for the public to see our proceedings.
Senator Corbin: At 2 o'clock in the morning, perhaps.
The Chairman: That is another matter; I cannot respond to that right now.
The Internal Economy Committee, of which you and I have been members for many years, has made this suggestion.
I wish to make a brief and important announcement before we proceed, namely, honourable senators, that the meeting with the Foreign Affairs Department on the topic of Ukraine and Russia -- the in camera meeting that members of the committee decided was necessary in the last Parliament -- will take place on Tuesday from 9:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Honourable senators will receive notices with regard to that meeting, but I wanted to take the opportunity to inform everyone. We all agreed that this was required.
Senator Bolduc: The problem is that the National Finance Committee is scheduled to meet at the same time on Tuesday, namely, from 9:30 to 11:00 a.m.
The Chairman: It has taken us a long time to schedule the meeting because the officials are either in Ukraine or Russia or doing various other things.
Senator Bolduc: You cannot postpone it to Thursday morning? That would be a better time for me.
Senator Corbin: I think you should inquire of the regular membership how many of us can attend.
The Chairman: I shall do that; you are absolutely correct.
Senator Corbin: I think I will be able to attend.
The Chairman: I wanted to bring it to your attention immediately -- I have just found this out myself -- as it is an issue that we all agree is important. I have found it difficult to get a time slot.
Senator Di Nino: Senator Corbin has a good idea. Perhaps our clerk could make a few calls. I received the notice and I am able to attend. Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not have another committee meeting at that time. However, if there is not a large enough participation from our standing committee, we may wish to schedule the meeting for a later date.
The Chairman: I completely agree with you, Senator Di Nino. Senator Bolduc is one of our longest-serving members and is helpful to the committee. We shall certainly do the best we can to ensure that the time for meeting is one that is convenient.
We do not want our witness today to have to remain here for any longer than necessary, so I should like to introduce Mr. Aurel Braun, professor of political science and international relations at the University of Toronto, who will be talking to us about Russia.
Professor Braun, please proceed with your presentation. Following that, the members of the committee will have questions for you.
Mr. Aurel Braun, Professor, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto: Honourable senators, I shall speak about a subject that regardless of how much time I am allocated I always feel I do not have enough. I shall speak for about 15 minutes, after which I hope we can have a rigorous intellectual workout. Russia will be the focus of my presentation. Following that, perhaps we can get into specific questions about Russia and some of the surrounding states.
Few, if any, countries have undergone more traumatic changes in the 20th century than Russia. External wars and internal repression have, not surprisingly, made citizens of that vast country crave security almost above all else. In the new millennium, Russia is a vastly different state than it was merely 10 years ago. It is a large fragment of an enormous empire whose messianic, universalistic ideology imploded.
Russia is a country formally committed to pluralistic democracy and at peace with its former enemies. Nevertheless, security remains a primary concern. Security in the newer era, though, must be broadly construed, in sharp contrast with the narrow Soviet definition. Security must be built on an interplay of several domestic and external variables, all part of Russia's political, social and economic transition and its international repositioning.
The new millennium has brought a new leadership to Russia, one that has an opportunity to build on the fragile democratic initiatives begun under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, has shown an appreciation of the need to understand security more broadly. Unlike Isaiah Berlin's hedgehog, which understood one big thing, Putin indicated early on that he understood at least two major requirements for successfully transforming Russia. First, he declared that, to restore the importance of Russia, he had to improve the economy and raise the standard of living. Second, he contended that political and economic success could not be achieved without implementing the rule of law.
It is striking that when Putin was asked early last year whom he admired most he mentioned two Western European leaders: Ludwig Earhard, the former chancellor of Germany, and Charles de Gaulle, the former president of France. Earhard was the man possibly more responsible than anyone else for keeping Germany on the right track of democratization and marketization, particularly during the difficult period between 1950 to 1954. Earhard's success was in no small measure due to a single-minded commitment to democracy and the rule of law as well as markets that came from his realization that there were no other viable alternatives.
De Gaulle's contribution to transition in France is also noteworthy because, despite his rhetoric about the grandeur of France, it was he who persuaded the French to pull out of Algeria and finally ended the dreams of an empire. He therefore brought to France a much-needed sense of realism that distinguished between a desire for international respect and dangerous imperial illusions. Putin and his new government could hardly look to better models.
There is indeed much to be encouraged about during Putin's first year of rule. He has attempted to bring a new sense of realism to governing Russia. He has been remarkably blunt and honest with the Russian people about the sorry state of the Russian economy. He has declared that, even if Russia's economy were to grow rapidly, at 8 per cent per year it would take 15 years for it to reach the current level of development of Portugal, one of the poorest members of the European Union.
Putin has a no-nonsense style of governing -- skazano-sdelano, which translated means "said and done." Moreover, he has continued to say the right things. Earlier this month, in a Webcast from the Kremlin, he declared, "I am sure that the state does not have an alternative to democratic development and a market economy."
Putin pledged to continue, as long as he remained head of state, to adhere to democratic principles and to develop civil society. In the past year, he has encouraged economic liberalization and his government has moved to reduce the power of and prosecute two of the most notorious oligarchs, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky. Putin has also travelled widely and has thoroughly impressed Western leaders such as Tony Blair, of the United Kingdom, and Gerhard Schroeder, of Germany.
Russia's economy has grown significantly in 2000. Real gross domestic product grew by more than 7 per cent and inflation declined to about 20 per cent. The government has moved from a budget deficit to a surplus. Exports surpassed imports by about $45 billion U.S. The Central Bank added about $20 billion to its hard currency reserves. The ruble remained stable during the year. Russia paid off some debts that it owed to the Paris Club. In its foreign relations, Russia gained considerable European support for its opposition to the American intent to build and deploy the National Missile Defence system, the NMD. It all appears to be so encouraging.
Sadly, there continues to be a vast gap between appearance and reality in Russia. Much of the economic growth and the export and budgetary surpluses are due to the very sharp increases of the international price of oil rather than sound economic planning and development. If anything characterized the government's economic policies in the past year, it has been indecisiveness. That includes from the president down to the economic development and trade minister, German Gref. Land and tax reforms have stalled. Commercial law remains ineffective and the economy continues to be wracked by corruption. The prosecution of the oligarchs has been highly selective, aimed perhaps more at bringing their media empires under government control than ending nefarious business practices. Other oligarchs have continued to build their empires, though they have been more circumspect in their public activities. Little planning has been done for a possible downturn of international oil prices or the increasing inflationary pressures from continued high prices.
The government's moves against the oligarchs and Putin's mistrustful attitude towards the press are beginning to have a chilling effect, at least on the television medium. The judiciary remains largely unreformed. Judges are generally poorly trained, badly paid and have a rather low social status. They continue to exhibit the old Soviet reflection of looking for political direction and guidance for judicial decisions. Consequently, the general population has little faith in the probity and effectiveness of the judicial system, and the business community even less so. In the past year, Russia has done little to close the economic, political and legal gap with successful transition states in Eastern Europe such as Poland and Hungary.
There are additional sources of instability. Well over a year after it started, the latest conflict in Chechnya remains unresolved, with neither a military nor a negotiated political solution in sight. However, this conflict has not damaged Putin's great personal popularity, and the absence of the "CNN effect" and a carefully orchestrated Russian international "information" campaign have mitigated international damage to Russia's image.
Politically, though, Russia continues to face instability with possible votes of non-confidence in the Kasyanov cabinet and possibly new Duma elections, though today, for the time being, at least, the government has escaped the Communists, who tried to push through a vote of non-confidence and did not succeed.
It is little wonder that Russia remains an atomized and insecure society. The population is prone to giving credence to the most outlandish conspiracy theories. They are deeply cynical, not only about politicians but also about the democratic political order. They are highly resentful of those who achieve economic success. They are reluctant to re-examine the regressive past, and thus are susceptible to dangerously misguided nostalgia. The population is increasingly suspicious of foreigners and the outside world. This is hardly the vibrant civil society that Putin declared that he aspires to build. Yet, without that civil society, there is likely to be little domestic security and political stability.
Perhaps as compensation, Putin's government has been remarkably active internationally. Putin himself has become a globetrotting politician who has visited North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba, and fondly hobnobs with Western European and Canadian leaders.
Putin's energy and Russia's increased international activity can be viewed as part of Russia's legitimate attempts to increase, or at least safeguard, its international security. On closer examination, though, this is at best only part of the story. What is at work is a blend of domestic and foreign considerations shaped by clever but shortsighted tactics, rather than the broad strategic vision of security that Putin seemed to promise early in his rule.
Externally, Russia is moving in three areas: one, trying to stop further enlargement of NATO; two, attempting to block NMD; and three, re-establishing military and economic ties with old Soviet clients, as well as searching for new markets for Russian military hardware and know-how.
The first area is where the Russians perhaps have the most legitimate security concerns, for they can make plausible arguments about the dangers of new divisions and walls in Europe rather than the desired bridge-building and integration. Ironically, though, this is where Russia has generated perhaps the least amount of international sympathy.
Second, in the case of NMD, Russia has cleverly played on Western European fears but its tactics smack too much of the old Soviet attempts of separating Western Europe from the United States and greatly weakening NATO. Russia's claims of the dangers of NMD to its own security, moreover, are not only greatly exaggerated but are predicated on the unsupportable assumption that somehow Russia has, and can maintain, strategic parity with United States, and that, moreover, this is necessary or even desirable in the post-Cold War era.
The third component is the most disturbing. Russia's ties to "rogue", or at least pariah, states is both desperate and misguided. It is the not merely an attempt to recover old Soviet loans to Libya, Iraq, Angola, Cuba and others -- there is an element of that, of course <#0107> but, rather, a futile request to keep alive a vast, obsolescent and parasitic military complex in Russia. It also part of a policy to ensure that Russia is a crucial global player by employing clever, Soviet-like tactics to outflank United States.
Yet, it is hardly in Russia's interest to maintain an oversized military industry when its primary economic goal should be the fundamental transformation of the civilian economy to one driven by economic demand rather than ideological fantasies. Further, Russian military sales may well present long-term dangers that will boomerang, for any congruence of interest with Iran, for instance, is likely to be temporary. Most important, though, these activities create doubt about Russia's desire for integration into the community of democratic states, or, at the very least, create the risk that Russia's increased association with the outcasts of the international system delegitimizes it as a responsible international actor.
Russia, therefore, has to both formulate a clear strategic vision and have the willpower to implement it if it is to successfully achieve its declared goals of democratization, marketization and overall security. It is important to acknowledge Russian successes, but it would be a mistake to ignore the major shortcomings, the lost opportunities and the misguided tactics. Clever tactics simply are not a substitute for that larger strategic vision that Putin at first seemed so ready to embrace. The West does not do itself or the Russian people any favours if it fails to convey not only its support for the progress that Russia has made but also a profound disquiet about some of the decisions that it is taking.
The Chairman: President Putin has said that it would be beneficial if Western Europe were clear about its intentions toward Eastern Europe. For example, the European Union has said that it will expand into Poland and the Baltic states, but in fact has not and is having increasing difficulties expanding, but NATO has expanded into Poland, Czechoslovakia, et cetera. We have also heard stories about Ukraine going into NATO.
It is less clear about the United States, as it is not on the Russian border, but it could be argued that the Western countries have taken advantage of the fact that Russia is going through and has gone through an enormous change and revolution since 1990 and that this will obviously continue for a long time. It does not surprise me that the Russian government would take steps to counter what they might see as anti-Russian activity on the part of Western foreign ministers and NATO, as a particular example. It is hard for me to understand what possible purpose it serves Poland to be a member of NATO. It is clear to me that Poland should be a member of the European Union, which would raise its standard of living, whereas NATO will do nothing for Poland except possibly cost it money it cannot afford.
Does it seem unrealistic that the Russians will make moves, given that atmosphere?
Mr. Braun: You have raised a complex set of interlocking issues. I will try to dissect them, as each one has a particular significance.
Clarity would be important in terms of giving a policy lead. It was hoped that in the post-Cold War era there would be a policy lead of predictability or certainty -- that, unlike enemies, friends can signal to each other, so that Russia would know more precisely what it has to deal with later on. The Eastern Europeans would have preferred that as well.
There is far too much uncertainty, particularly from the Russian perspective. Will NATO enlarge further, and when? What countries will be included? Will it be restricted to what we still call Eastern European states or will it include some of the Baltic states, or possibly even the Ukraine, which would make things very complicated. Will the EU expand? It has promised that it will expand.
The East Europeans have been eager to get into NATO. The way they formulated their desire to get into NATO, not surprisingly, worried Russia. Although the East Europeans were saying that they do not fear Russia, that it is not a case that they are trying to build new walls or that they will expand NATO to Russia's borders in order to threaten Russia, from the Russian perspective they have been asking questions. They have asked: If there is no fear and if there are good relations, what is the need for enlargement? The reply by the Hungarians in particular was that it was an insurance policy, and that this is all it was.
As you pointed out, this is an expensive insurance policy. It is costing the East Europeans quite a bit. One does not buy an insurance policy unless one fears a real risk. What is that risk? The risk is from Russia. There is a psychological factor. You will notice almost a reclassification of geography. I use the term "Eastern Europe," but it has become an increasingly offensive term to many countries in Eastern Europe. The Polish and the Czechs do not wish to view themselves as part of Eastern Europe. The Hungarians want to be known as Central Europeans, or even Western Europeans, which is far from an historical perspective, but it is also a kind of separation from Russia.
There is the notion in Eastern Europe that, somehow, Russia is congenitally antidemocratic, that it cannot join the community of western nations and, therefore, it needs to be contained, it needs to be quarantined. Not surprisingly, Russia finds that disturbing. This is coming from the East Europeans. The Russians would not fear that much if this were merely an East European view. What they see is that three East European countries are now part of NATO, with certain restrictions. They are waiting to see what happens in the other cases. Any further enlargement will make things difficult, especially for democrats and Russia, because it plays into the hands of the extremists who are saying that the West cannot be trusted, the West has ulterior motives, the enlargement of NATO is to humiliate and, eventually, to hem in and to diminish Russia.
What about the EU? To many East Europeans, the EU is the ideal organization to join. For some, joining NATO was to be a stepping stone to getting into the EU because that is from whom they will obtain the financial help and where the markets will be opened up. There are expectations, especially in the most successful states in Eastern Europe. I refer to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia, which has announced that it will be able to enter soon. Sadly, I fear that those expectations will be disappointed because the EU is too busy dealing with its own problems let alone taking on new expenses and new difficulties.
During one conference that I attended, a journalist whom I shall not name was an extremely ardent supporter of the enlargement of NATO. I found this odd. One would have thought that there was a logic to an enlargement of NATO being followed by an enlargement of the EU. "No, no," he said, "that does not follow logically. On the contrary, it is easy to join NATO with rusty tanks. It is not possible to join the EU with rusty tractors." There will be no room for the East Europeans, not for a long time.
Russia cannot know when this will happen. Russia is much more likely to live with an EU enlargement than with a NATO enlargement.
Senator Bolduc: I do not understand what you are saying from the point of view of Germany and Western Europe. How about the point of view of France, Italy and England? If they do not get those people in the European Union, those people will work particularly well with their neighbour, namely, Germany. That is the biggest and newest country in Europe. Personally, I see a different perspective about Eastern Europe from the point of view of France, England and Italy than if you are in Germany. I suspect that people in Brussels and elsewhere in the European capitals are also aware of that situation. That may be contrary to the perspective that you just gave us in which you said that the European Union is not ready to allow them entrance. I know that they are not ready for many reasons, such as grants in agriculture, and so on. However, there is still a problem for the European Union.
For Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia being within NATO, obviously, for them it was for protection against Russia, but it was mostly an additional argument to be eligible for the European Union. What do you think of that perspective?
Mr. Braun: I appreciate your comment because it is essential to understand that the European Union is not homogenous. There are differences of view within the European Union. When I spoke about the EU as a whole, I tended to formulate a general kind of attitude without really looking at the specifics. Let me now look at the specifics.
Indeed, there are shades of difference that ought not to be ignored. Among the shades of difference one sees the French taking a somewhat different view from the Germans. There is, indeed, a French concern about ensuring that the European Union is not dominated by a single state. Clearly, a united Germany is by far the largest economy. It has the largest population. It carries the greatest weight, which is making France, to a degree, rather uncomfortable.
From that strategic perspective alone, one can see that the French would be more amenable to an enlargement. That is so because having Poland come in with almost 40 million people, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, would add a substantial population. Certainly, that would diminish the possibility of one state dominating the union. However, the French are also realists. They understand the costs involved. It would be very difficult to tell the French farmers, who are a very independent group, that they will have to compete with farm products from Poland and Hungary, that they will have to provide subsidies, that they will have to deal with the costs of integration, even though more of that cost will be borne by Germany. There is a kind of dichotomy of views in France, which is more sympathetic than in Germany. Overall, France is still rather reluctant to push for that expansion because they understand the complications and the costs.
Eventually, if there is to be that enlargement, the impetus will come more from France than from Germany. In a sense, by trying to integrate Eastern Germany, Germany has been taught a very abject lesson. Eastern Germany has 16 million people. What we have witnessed in the past decade is possibly the largest transfer of wealth from one part to another part, amounting to over $1 billion. They have a long way to go. The standard in Eastern Germany is nowhere near the standard of Western Germany. More than that, it is not just an economic factor. What the Germans have learned is that economic improvement does not bring about commensurate political appreciation and stability. There is a tremendous amount of resentment in Eastern Germany. Those from the East do not fully appreciate those from the West. In large numbers, they continue to vote for the ex-communists. One cannot explain political behaviour exclusively through economic factors.
Part of the foundation of the European Union has been this neofunctionalist approach, which is predicated on certain economic benefits driving different kinds of political behaviour. The Germans are beginning to understand it more than, perhaps, others. As a result, they are not cost conscious but political conscious.
The Chairman: Before I call on Senator Di Nino, I should like to point out that we are not discussing the European Union. However, an important aspect that Senator Bolduc has brought up is the fact that Germany is Russia's biggest customer and biggest investor. I have been to at least four frontier points between Poland and Germany. German interest in Poland and Russia is enormous. When the bank crash took place, the German banks lost billions of dollars.
Senator Di Nino: Obviously, the motivation is also the huge potential economic market that exists over there. There are many people in that part of the world.
Mr. Braun, you made a comment about the difficulties that Putin is having in the "westernization" of the economy from the standpoint of his political opponents. Could you share with us your thoughts about the Russian people in that position, whether they are supportive. Do they mistrust the West and its efforts, or are they applauding or encouraging them?
Mr. Braun: One of the more distressing developments in the past few years -- and this is backed up both by polling evidence and by anecdotal evidence -- is that there has been an increasingly negative view among the general Russian population toward the West. This is due to a number of factors. It is due partly to NATO enlargement, partly to the West's actions in Yugoslavia, which the Russians found very humiliating regardless of where they stood on the issue. The Russians are suffering from an identity crisis. They were part of an empire, a superpower that was respected internationally. They are now a state that is seeking handouts and must repay debts to various countries. There is that grinding humiliation, and Russians resent that.
Russians attribute the increasingly visible differentiation in living standards within Russia to the market economy. They associate the market economy with corruption, as they do democracy. Unjustifiably and sadly this is the case. Therefore, we see a kind of variance between popular attitudes in Russia and what we see in terms of popular attitudes in the states where the transition has been more successful, for example, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary or Slovenia.
This must be addressed by the Russian leadership. Unfortunately, the lesson that can be drawn from what happened in Germany in the post-war period -- there are obviously enormous differences in Eastern Europe; however, there are certain commonalties -- is that there are no magical third ways. There are no shortcuts to success. You must move quickly and decisively to build institutions, form credibility, create a viable economy, and deal with corruption. Corruption is absolutely destructive to political confidence and legitimacy. Putin spoke of the rule of law, of having an independent judiciary. That is something that is in congruence with western constitutionalism, with the ideals of democracy, but it is not working out. If this is what legal transformation means, the Russians wonder whether it is worthwhile.
Senator Di Nino: Obviously, Putin must consider the support of the public if he wishes to be re-elected. That will be part of the challenge that he will face.
There has been some suggestion that the pace of democratic reform in Russia, which is probably faster than some of the other states in that grouping of countries, may actually be a negative to economic reform. Is this a point of view you share? Would you like to give us some thoughts on that?
Mr. Braun: There are various theories, including those that suggest that, in order to do what is necessary economically, you might need some sort of strong political hand, or you might need to move more gradually -- two different political perspectives but both suggest a different kind of approach.
In one of these cases, what has been bandied about has been the Pinochet model, a strong political hand and, therefore, rapid political transformation. I do not think that that would work in Russia. The situation in Russia is different than the situation in Chile. Those who suggest a Pinochet model have not analysed closely what happened in Chile or the Russian economy. Russia has inherited the Soviet system, the traumas from the loss of empire and truncating an economy that was so closely linked. The Stalinist system was the creation of components to make separation difficult. Therefore, when Ukraine and Belarus separated, for example, Russia was left with an economy that suffered not only from the problems of a Marxist-Leninist economy but also the complications of separation. Therefore, the Pinochet model would not work.
The other model of moving more slowly would not work either, because I think what we have learned about transitions is that momentum is absolutely crucial. If momentum is not maintained, you do not move rapidly enough, then the old forces begin to reassert themselves. Then you have the worst of all worlds. You have the commitment and the rhetoric of transformation, you have the expectations of improvement, and yet you have the stifling effects of the old order. That has proven to be utterly disastrous. That is why Russia must move decisively.
What was encouraging about Putin at the beginning was that he articulated what seemed to be a positive vision, namely, the need to move quickly and deliberately and that there was to be no detour because detours would be futile. Such a vision takes a significant amount of political will and legitimacy. The people must be brought along. That is the debate: Do you proceed with the political or economic efforts first?
I have no doubt, in everything that I have seen and learned, that politics is the most important. There must be legitimacy. People are willing to make sacrifices if they believe in the political order. They are not willing to make sacrifices if they do not believe in that political order. This is why credibility is essential. This is why they must address corruption. This is why, in a democratic system, there is scepticism. However cynicism is something else; cynicism is utterly destructive.
What we see in Russia is a dangerous shift from scepticism, which is not unexpected or unhealthy, to cynicism, where in large segments of the population there is no faith or little faith in the political order. In that kind of situation, it is difficult to make the wrenching political and economic changes.
Whatever is done will be painful. Some economists refer to this as "transition pain." It will happen regardless of what policy is pursued. If this transition pain is to be endured, it is essential that there be successes. If you do not have successes, then all you have is the cost.
Senator Graham: Senator Di Nino's comments about the pace of economic reform being perhaps a negative leads me to a question about the state of democracy in Russia.
You have suggested, as the world knows, that Russia is anxious to integrate with democratic states. You also mentioned during the course of your remarks that there is always the possibility of a non-confidence vote. I believe you said that it had been unsuccessfully attempted recently.
Mr. Braun: It was today.
Senator Graham: We are right up to date, then. That leads me to the question about the state of the current electoral law in Russia. Has it been revised or revisited of late? Do the people themselves have confidence in the electoral law? Is it generally regarded by the people as fair? What is the level of trust among the people about the current electoral law?
Mr. Braun: There have been several attempts to try to improve the electoral law because there have been too many questions raised about the validity of outcomes. This is why it is important to look at the total picture -- that is, not only the laws that are on the books but also the implementation mechanisms, the adherence to the law and the processes of complaints. For a law to operate there must be a judiciary that really works -- that is, one that is independent, competent and dependable. There must be a free press that is vigilant and honest, to speak up about it.
The problem in Russia, therefore, is systemic. You cannot just address the laws. It is easy to pass wonderful laws that seem to cope with a lot of these issues, but it takes a lot more than that. That is why I found it so profoundly disturbing when I examined the state of the judiciary in Russia.
The judiciary in Russia is not moving quickly enough in terms of democratizing and of being independent. It is a difficult task to change the judiciary -- communism collapsed in Russia at the end of 1991 and there are no judges who have been born since 1991. You will get individuals on the bench who are lawyers that were trained in the old system. They must be retrained. Russia remains very much a status society. They have to be better paid and their social status has to be increased so that they are able to stand up to government abuses.
One of the other worrying signs is what has been happening to the Russian press. At one level it is not unjustifiable for the Putin government to go after either some or all of the oligarchs for corruption because it would be difficult not to find corruption in Russia if you were to look for it. However, it is something else when it affects the freedom of press. In their activities, these oligarchs were intertwined with press activities. There has been a chilling effect. There have been actions against journalists, whether it was violence or journalists disappearing.
So, when you really want to ensure that electoral laws work well, you must ask: Where is the relatively free press? There is no absolutely free or objective press. You only have to look at some of the newspapers in Canada to see that not all newspapers or writers are objective. Over all, however, one gets a plurality of views. The risk is having this kind of plurality of views -- that is, of having an independent judiciary and of having institutions that have credibility. This is where Russia has to move.
Indications at the moment are that if there were an election right now for Parliament the supporters of Putin would do very well because he remains very popular. Even if you had a free election, he is likely to win. But there are significant questions about whether such an election would really be free by reasonable standards applied in Western Europe.
Senator Graham: Would Russia welcome international election observers?
Mr. Braun: It has in the past. There have been election observers. In fact, we have sent elections observers. However, westerners have made many mistakes in the way in which observers were sent.
You do not send observers to see if they are stuffing ballots because that is the most crude way of rigging an election. You need to look at the most subtle forms, for example, at funding, at building parties, at the possibility of contacting donors and contacting supporters and at press coverage. It is a process. You have to look at an election not in its last week but at the very beginning, when the campaign starts -- or even just prior to that -- to examine the entire process to see if it is fair. That is where the big problems exist.
Senator Graham: In Russia, do they not have established centres for democratic education?
Mr. Braun: Yes, there have been. Western nations have provided training for western scholars. We have even offered training for Russian judges. This is all very important. We can do more, however. There must also be a receptivity on the part of the Russians. Again, what is disconcerting somewhat is that this receptivity to democratic ideas has been diminishing in Russia for a variety of reasons.
It is important on the part of the Putin leadership to move with new vigour in that direction. Putin did seem to understand the primacy of the political factors. I do not think he was being cynical when he said that they have no other choice than democracy, that the rule of law is absolutely crucial to that transformation, as is economic transformation.
The fact that Russia is acting internationally in a matter that is not compatible with it being a good member of the club of democratic states is also not a indication that they are moving in a democratic direction fast enough and vigorously enough.
Senator Graham: My next question relates to whether or not international observers would be welcome in Russia itself. Would they be regarded by some as interfering?
As an example, I was leader of a delegation that observed an election in Bulgaria a few years ago. At the press conference the day after the election, everything was going along well until one journalist asked, "When will you no longer consider it necessary to interfere?" This was directed more at the United States because I was there with the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. That is when I got my first question as a moderate Canadian. I replied, "When you no longer invite us." I pointed out that we had been invited by all of the parties and by the Human Rights Commission, and so on, and that we were there to learn and to observe and to report to the world and not to any particular government. However, I did observe that maybe some day in the future -- and, perhaps it was a bit prophetic looking at what happened in Florida in the recent United States election -- there could be problems. I said that all the parties had agreed on the electoral law in Bulgaria at that particular point. The question was whether or not people from developed countries, whether it was Canada, the United States, or wherever, would come and look at those models. Could that apply in Russia as well?
Mr. Braun: Clearly, there is a resentment in Russia about western interference when it is heavy-handed, when it is preachy, when it is doomed by an attitude of superiority and triumphalism. It is very important for Western countries to be sensitive to what has happened in Russia. This is a deeply traumatized country undergoing an identity crisis. The Russian tradition has been to be part of an empire. Now it is trying to be a country by itself, shorn of its empire, with something like 25 million Russians nevertheless living out outside of Russia, in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Latvia and elsewhere. This is a very large diaspora. Russia is no longer a superpower; it is encountering economic difficulties. In this kind of situation, it is very easy for Russians to mistake help for a lecture. Therefore, one needs to be careful how to offer and to deliver help.
Having said that, at the same time, I do not think that the West needs to be apologetic about the imperatives of democracy. We have enough data to show that, as imperfect as democracy is, and as shabby as the election in Florida may have been, the alternatives are far worse. Therefore, if the Russians invite us, they need to understand that it is more for their benefit than for ours and that we are there as observers, not to condemn them but to try to help the process. That is the best way to do that.
The Chairman: We could look easily at the Russian election statistics. I followed the last several elections and was astounded at how regular they looked. We can examine them very simply by getting the figures and tallying them up vis-à-vis the parties.
Senator Carney: So far we have tended to deal with Russia as if it were a cohesive entity and not a country covering 10 time zones. We have also tended to deal with it from the European aspect. I should like to switch to Pacific Russia and to more regional concerns. That is because I am a westerner, and most of our business with Russia in Western Canada is with Siberia and Pacific Russia. There are companies in Western Canada successfully doing business in that area.
Does Russia have enough control over such regions as Pacific Russia, over cities such as Vladivostok and Magadan, to support the kind of electoral and judicial reform to which you refer, or will it be a piecemeal approach?
Mr. Braun: Russia is a very difficult country to govern under the best of circumstances. Its population exceeds 145 million people and its territory is vast. Under Boris Yeltsin, many of the regional leaders acquired vast power and enormous wealth. That wealth was not always acquired, let us say, honestly. The regional leaders developed fiefdoms, and it was difficult for democratic processes started in Moscow to filter down to the regional level.
I must also say that there were other cases where there were, for example, in Nizhniy Novgorod, very strong democratic developments from the bottom up. Those situations are different. However, Vladivostok was not viewed as a paragon of good government and honesty.
The Putin government has moved to strengthen central control. This policy has benefits but creates some risks. The benefits are that Russia might be able to get rid of some of the most corrupt regional leaders. This would bring some political and economic stability and some predictability, which would make these areas more viable, not just for foreign investment but for domestic investments as well.
One of the sad things in the Russian economy is that so much money has been flowing out of Russia because there is no confidence in the local economy.
The downside to strengthened central control is that it diminishes local democracy. In a sense, there must be both direction from the top and movement from the bottom. It is a matter of finding the right kind of balance.
From Moscow, there has been some neglect of the eastern regions, moving toward Siberia and Vladivostok. The focus in Russia is westward. One of the things we have to understand about Russia in terms of its development is identity. The question has been asked: Is Russia a European or Asiatic state? The Europeans, rather contemptuously, have this line that the east begins just after Poland. Joseph Brodsky, the Nobel Prize-winning poet, has that cruel line about Russia really being western Asia.
The focus of Russia is primarily European. Russia generally views itself as a European state. Potentially, in terms of democratic transformation, this is a positive. However, in terms of dealing with regional problems, it often leads to a neglect that is very risky, causing the problems one finds in Vladivostok and elsewhere. Those problems have to be dealt with with some urgency because these areas are important to Russia in terms of resources. They are strategically important to Russia in dealing with China and Japan. Russia simply cannot afford to neglect these areas.
Senator Carney: We are a federal Senate. I note what you say about the regimes in places such as Vladivostok. However, the people, I am told, who live and work there are very fine people. They may be poor by our standards, but they are very fine people.
Is there any way we could help the democratic process at the municipal or provincial level? Is there anything we should be doing in terms of federal-level funding of municipal or provincial delegations, so that my friend, Senator Graham, would be able to advise or assist at the local level? Do you think that sort of action would be more helpful than just going to Moscow? We could go to Magadan, Vladivostok and other places.
Mr. Braun: One of the positive developments in the past several years has been that the Western approaches have become less Moscow-centric. Increasingly, there is a realization that there are local and municipal governments, that one does not just deal through Moscow, that one has to go to St. Petersburg or Vladivostok, to the local government. More can and should be done,
However, there has to be receptivity. These regions want to do it. We cannot force help on them. We cannot intrude unless they wish help from us, whether it is advice on municipal restructuring, on municipal bylaws, or on basic local governance. I think it can be done, but we have to get the right kind of signals. It is not a matter of just throwing money or experts at the problem.
Senator Carney: How do we get those signals? This committee has heard that we do not even have an honorary consul in Vladivostok. Some of us would maintain that we should have a full post abroad in Pacific Russia because that is where many of our interests lie. In the absence such a post, how could we even solicit interest? Do you have any suggestions on what the infrastructure is there?
Mr. Braun: We have an active consul in St. Petersburg and it works very well. We did not pay as such attention to the second city. There is no reason, given the interests of Western Canada, that we ought not to open a consulate in a place like Vladivostok. We can signal an interest on our part, but then we must wait for signals that they are receptive to doing certain kinds of things or seeking our advice.
The question that was raised previously about Russian sensitivity or resentment, whether it exists in Russia, Bulgaria or elsewhere, is something that we must appreciate. There must be willingness.
We talked about the transformation of Western Europe and why we cannot have a Marshall Plan approach to Russia. One of the distinguishing features of the Marshall Plan was the willingness of the Western Europeans to have American involvement and the effectiveness with which they used the money that was sent and the expertise that was transferred.
Senator Carney: I am glad to have some support for a post in Vladivostok, because I am of the opinion that Foreign Affairs would like to have some support for that.
Senator Corbin: As a member of the Canadian public, my impression of Russians -- and I am talking about the common people, the Russians, not the power grabbers, the institutions, the oligarchs, the regional governors, the princes, or whatever you want to call them -- is that they suffer from the four Ds, despondency, depression, discouragement and devaluation of lifestyles.
The great cultural institutions have been considerably diminished. They are in tatters, if not in rags, some of them. We hear prognostications about the relative health of Russia. The relative health of a nation is measured by the relative happiness of the people. Are the Russian people happy?
Mr. Braun: That is a tough question to answer. In United Nations surveys, Canada is ranked as the happiest country. I am not sure how valid indices of happiness are. In general terms, Russia has never been happy. I am not trying to be facetious about this. One of the problems is that there is not an honest re-examination of the past in Russia. Often you have dangerous nostalgia. There is a predilection to say that Russians win all the Olympics, are respected around the world and that the Bolshoi and the Kirov ballet companies were the best in the world; that there was a tremendous culture and medical care. Much of this was myth. One must look at the whole package -- if it were not myth what was the cost? The average Russian worker did not go to those great cultural institutions. The average Russian worker paid a horrific price to subsidize the elite who went to those institutions.
Senator Corbin: The Russian worker is not paid.
The Chairman: We are talking about the past, Senator Corbin.
Senator Corbin: I know, but that leads to the current situation.
Mr. Braun: Corruption in Russia is not something new. It has been there for a long time. The Soviet Union was, in many respects, one of the most corrupt systems in human history. It was corrupt at the very heart of politics in the denial of human freedoms and dignity. It was corrupt in the way things were done, whether in planning or implementation. In a sense, what you have right now is a decentralization of corruption.
I remember talking to a western businessman who was despondent in Moscow, saying, "It is not like the old days when I went to the Soviet Union. Then you knew exactly whom to bribe. Now everybody has their hands out."
Let us not create a revisionist view of the past that there was this loss of everything. There were some things that were lost, such as predictability. People had miserable jobs, but they knew they had a job and they were not threatened with unemployment. There was not the conspicuous consumption that you have now. It is not that there was not elitism. Gorbachev did not live the lifestyle of the average worker, nor did the members of the politburo. They had special medical care and life-saving drugs that were not available to the average citizen. They could travel abroad, something that was not available to average citizens. But it was done covertly -- not in the way it is done with airlines. I just flew on Air Canada, and I wanted to fly economy and not business class. I did exactly as I was told. As soon as we took off, a curtain was pulled between economy and business class. Behind that curtain something happens; I suspect it may have to do with a difference in food and beverage. It is not that great a mystery, but it is done for a psychological reason, so as not to offend or annoy people in economy while others are being served.
This is what communism did. The special shops were hidden. The special privileges and clinics were hidden. Now it is out in the open. It is a kind of in-your-face capitalism. This is especially humiliating. You can see the differences. It is not that differences did not exist before; they did. However, now they are out in the open. There are many benefits to that. I prefer the open differences. It was a fantasy to believe that everybody was equal. The statistics out of the Soviet Union were that there were no wage differentials. To say that Brezhnev had the same wage as a coal miner in Siberia, that somehow on that miserable wage he was able to maintain 37 cars, 41 mistresses, and 51 palaces was a remarkable exercise in saving. The oligarchs were present then, too.
Senator Corbin: What about the people?
Mr. Braun: The people are undergoing much pain. The Russians have a tradition of accepting suffering but they have difficulty accepting uncertainty. What they are confronting is uncertainty. Russia, in a sense, is a land in-between. In Eastern Europe, at least in the case of the successful transition states, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, one can say that they have reached a take-off point where it is unlikely that they would regress. That is not the case in Russia. I am not suggesting that Russia can regress to old communism -- I do not think that that is viable. However, there are other forms of red and brown combinations, of xenophobic, anti-Semitic and authoritarian combinations, a kind of toxic political cocktail of extremism that remains a risk in Russia. There is this kind of uncertainty. It is an atomized society.
They have not been successful in the way some of the Eastern European states have been in building a vibrant civil society. They have created some elements, and one should not dismiss what has been done so far. There are many small entrepreneurs. We keep looking at the oligarchs who, by and large, are very corrupt, but there are many people who have been creating small enterprises. There is a significant amount of energy and we need to focus on that. If you look at 1998, when the ruble collapsed there was no hunger in Russia because a mechanism came into place based partly on the evolution of civil society. In the fringes of the market economy, it made a difference. But it is moving too slowly, which is creating a lot of impatience and unhappiness.
The short answer to your question is, yes, the Russian people are unhappy. What will make them happier? That is the big question.
Senator Graham: But are they happier than they have been? Senator Corbin's question was: Are they happy? That is a legitimate question. We always wonder about that because we see their faces on television and we read about their situations in newspapers, and so on. Are they happier today than they were 15 years ago?
Mr. Braun: It is hard to say because we cannot measure exactly what we were like 15 years ago. It was an extraordinarily repressive society 15 years ago, even though in 1986 glasnost and perestroika were starting.
They now have choices that they did not have before. The electoral system is imperfect -- we talked about that already -- but it is still vastly better and vastly more democratic than that which has existed in Russia since that very brief period in 1917 when the provisional government was in. They have a means of expressing their happiness or unhappiness at the election polls, by leaving or by moving from one location to the other more easier than before.
At the very least, there are ways of channelling the feelings of the Russians into some sort of political expression that did not exist before. That is an extraordinarily important development that ought not to be minimized.
The Chairman: The points that Senators Corbin and Graham have raised lead us into this question of extremism. I have looked at the election results -- and I am realistic; I do not know how well the elections are run. I can imagine some of the election practices in a country that has just recently started to have elections.
Senator Di Nino: They do them here.
The Chairman: Yes. They do them in a lot of elections. They did them in Florida.
What is amazing is that the extremists received such a minuscule number of votes. Actually, the Russian elections broke down into two parties basically. Most people voted for the Unity Party, which decided today that they did not want to have a new confidence vote. This is the Putin party -- at least, I think that is what it is called. The other group voted for the reformed Communist Party, whatever it is. People like Zhirinovsky received a tiny number of votes. So, it is a great story to talk about extremists, but the results broke down in the same manner as in a lot of what we think of as democratic countries. The only facts are the actual election results. There were seven or eight parties in total, but in reality there were only two -- Putin's party and the reformed Communist Party. The rest were sort of nowhere, as they said about "Eclipse", the famous racehorse.
Mr. Braun: I am afraid, senator, that we will have to differ.
The Chairman: There is nothing wrong with that. Is there something wrong with those figures?
Mr. Braun: When you look at the break down in Parliament, you will see that the Unity Party did not get even half the votes. The communists got more. The Communist Party is not really reformed.
The Chairman: What I am saying is that that party received the other block of votes.
Mr. Braun: The Communist Party in Russia remains an extremist party. It is not the ex-communists in Poland. In Eastern Europe, the ex-communists in Poland and Hungary really changed their structure. They became social democratic party. If you look at Poland, for example, Krushnefsky, who headed the reformed communists, in a previous election, in 1993, said that the party had been totally changed. When someone asked him, during an interview, "What happens if one of the people running for this new social democratic party, the ex-communist party, tells us that he wants to have a command economy or that he would like to have single party rule, what would you do?" Krushnefsky said, "Well, I would fire him immediately -- not because he is a communist, but because he is an idiot. It does not work."
There is a perception in the ex-communist parties in Eastern Europe that Marxist-Leninism as an organizing doctrine has failed fundamentally. That is not the view of the communists in Russia. They remain an extremist force and they and the agrarians together are the largest party in the Parliament.
There are also other parties that contain large elements of extremism. When you look at the parties that are committed to pluralistic democracy in the Parliament in Russia, they really do not make up much more than a third at this stage. That is more than they had previously, but the picture is not that encouraging when you compare it to Eastern Europe. It is moving in the right direction, because the Unity Party has been stronger and if an election were held today it would likely gain more votes -- at least we think it is likely to do so. The united forces of the right are likely to get more votes, and Yabloko might get more votes.
We talked about unhappiness. There are a lot of people in Russia who look to the communists for a solution. They look to the communists' promises that they will use a strong hand to re-nationalize and rebuild the Soviet Union. They made statements like, "We will rebuild the Soviet Union."
The Chairman: I would like to give Senator Di Nino, who has been patient, the opportunity to ask a question.
Just before that, however, I wish to say that I looked at the election statistics carefully in terms of the vote percentages -- and I will not question what direction the former communist party would take if it gets elected because you are much more knowledgeable about it than I am -- and I would have said that most of the votes in Russia went either to the Unity Party or to the former communist party. The Liberal Party had about 6 per cent of the votes; Zhirinovsky's party had less than 2 per cent. My point is that they sort of break down into two blocks, as they do in Canada. Whether or not you like them, that is my observation.
Senator Di Nino: There is no question that Russia has serious problems -- the data is there. However, so do most countries in the world, but maybe not to the same degree.
We also hear a lot about corruption and things of that nature. Again, most countries in the world could say that they have corruption. We hear about electoral shenanigans, as we saw in Florida. I am not sure that Canada is totally clean on that as well. We are talking about degrees here.
However, we are talking about a country that, for three generations, if not more, was under the rule of a very oppressive government. It has only been barely a decade. Perhaps we are being overly critical. Tremendous progress has been achieved in the short period of time that this new democratic spirit has taken a foothold in Russia. Could you comment further on that? Is the West being overly critical? Are we giving up too quickly on a country that is trying to join the rest of the world in a very short period of time, when you look at the situation in totality?
Mr. Braun: First, let me address the issue of comparisons. This is something that is worth looking at.
Are we being unfair? Are we using a double standard? There is corruption in Florida and in Vladivostok. There are bad business practices in Arkansas and shady business practices in St. Petersburg. I would argue that it is not a difference of degree, it is a difference of substance.
There is no political order that is entirely corruption-free. There is no democratic process that is without risk and that does not need to be monitored. This is why the notion of citizenship is so important. Jefferson talked about permanent revolution.
The heart of a democratic system is that it is intrinsically honest, with corruption on the fringes, rather than fundamentally dishonest with some honesty on the fringes. Sadly, the Russian system at the moment has not progressed to the first and it is too much of the latter. Therefore, we have systemic problems. This translates into a loss of confidence in the political order that makes any economic transformation more difficult.
You are quite right that Russia has an enormous amount of difficulty in transforming and changing the psychology. In bringing about a transition, the most difficult thing to change is attitude. You can change institutions and processes, but attitudes and mentalities are ingrained.
On one of my visits to Russia, I was invited to dinner at a Moscow flat. The husband was a physicist and the wife was an economist. She had become not only conversant but also one who very much believed in not only the market but in supply side economics. She was very conservative, very tough on economic change and so on. At the end of the dinner, she served some wonderful strawberries. I complimented her on how wonderful these strawberries tasted and she said, "In Russia we grow the best strawberries in the world." Of course, I immediately acknowledged that this is true. She then said, "I am really angry. On my way home from work I went to the farmers market. I bought two kilos of strawberries and I paid about 5,000 rubbles per kilo. As I was walking out, across the aisle another farmer was selling strawberries and they were half the price. There ought to be a law against that." The rational and the emotional continue to clash.
Is it the case, therefore, that you move incrementally and gradually change mentality? The history of transformations in Eastern Europe -- and we have data for 10 years -- tells us exactly the opposite. Democrats in Russia tell us exactly the opposite as well. The more slowly you move, the more pain you will have, the less effective it will be. In a sense, the fact that Russia has not had democracy or experience with pluralism for such a long time would be not an argument for a slow movement but an argument for a more rapid movement to catch up.
Russia does not have time to waste. The real threat is bad authoritarian ideas that permeate mainstream parties. The communists and some of the other parties on the fringes, even within some of the parties that are committed to democracy, think there is some sort of authoritarian solution or magical third way. This has not happened anywhere. These individuals who look for a non-democratic solution make the argument that Russia is a different and unique country. While Russia is unique in many respects, the law of gravity operates in Russia the same as elsewhere. Some economic laws will operate in Russia in the same way. You can see that in monetary oversupplies, budgetary deficits and in having the need for commercial law, for education and for stock markets. There is no time to waste.
Senator Bolduc: We heard from Mr. Popov yesterday. I asked him a question about public administration and government. We know that Putin has tried to gain more control over the agents because the decentralization that operated during Yeltsin's time had some drawbacks. Seven super representatives of the federal government were then put in place to have oversight of the states. What has been the impact of that? Has that had an effect?
Mr. Braun: It is too early to tell. There are some visible benefits that some of the more corrupt officials have been reined in, but the problem is that there is an opportunity for the old-fashioned, top-down kind of forcing of policy. In the long term, that does not work. If it is just a temporary measure to get rid of some of the most corrupt officials, then it is viable. However, if this becomes more permanent and a pattern of behaviour, of Putin trying to control things from the centre, then I am not optimistic about the results politically or economically.
Senator Bolduc: We are not familiar enough -- at least, I am not -- with that vast part of the world in terms of anthropology. We began to look at it in terms of attitudes, but behind that there are values. That problem is basic. There is a whole world with people from various religions, languages and the entire gamut of differences. Tell me about the religious situation. What impact do the churches have in Russia, or are they dead?
Mr. Braun: There has been a remarkable revival of religion, with the Russian Orthodox church and other religions as well. In a democracy, one must have a separation of church and state. However, religion can play a positive part in helping to build civil society, in creating what political scientists call the crosscutting influences. Many of these developments in the revival of religion have been positive.
On the fringes, there has been some risk of extremism. There are tensions between Islam in parts, Chechnya, for example. Overall, this is one of the more positive developments. As long as there can be a balance where religion plays a function in helping to support and develop a civil society without being state- sanctioned and linked so closely that it becomes a kind of state religion, then that is positive.
Senator Graham: You mentioned how poorly the judges are trained in Russia. I know we have done some things. Is there anything further we can do?
Mr. Braun: I think we can do more in terms of training students. It is difficult do get admitted to law school in Canada, but we could bring over some of the brightest Russian students who have done law degrees more recently and give them a chance to access the courts here. That would be a positive development to bring them over in larger numbers.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, professor, for assisting us in the early part of our investigations into this vast subject. You have been very helpful and I thank you on behalf of the committee.
The committee adjourned.