---

Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs

Issue 9 - Evidence, May 2, 2001

---

OTTAWA, Wednesday, May 2, 2001

The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 4:00 p.m. to examine and report on emerging political, social, economic and security developments in Russia and Ukraine; Canada's policy and interests in the region; and other related matters.

Senator Peter A. Stollery (Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Chairman: Honourable senators, I call the meeting to order. Today's witnesses are from the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta. As the visitors may not be aware, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has embarked on an in-depth study of the state of the emerging political, social, economic and security developments in Russia and Ukraine.

This is the second month, I believe, of our hearings. Today, we are hearing from Professor Bohdan Klid and Professor David Marples. Our procedure generally is that you may decide between yourselves for an opening statement or presentation. We would like to keep it reasonably brief, but not so brief that you cannot make your points. We will have then questions from the senators. Have you decided who would go first?

Mr. David Marples, Professor, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta: We have not met each other for about a month, so we have not determined that.

The Chairman: I will go from left to right. Professor Marples, please start.

Mr. Marples: Ukraine has experienced a fairly tumultuous period since the re-election of Leonid Kuchma as president in November, 1999. At that time, the defeat of his communist rival appeared to indicate that Ukraine was committed to the path of reform, despite painfully slow progress and acute energy and economic problems.

Independent Ukraine, within its present borders is the state that was formed in the Soviet period before and after the Second World War. I think that several features of this state can be discerned.

There are several distinct regions of Ukraine. For the sake of convenience I have divided them up into four regions. First is what I call the "Far Western Ukraine." The people are Ukrainian speaking, fairly anti-Russian, and struggling economically. In Ukrainian elections, this region has always voted for the pro-western candidate.

Currently, this region seems alienated from the regime of Kuchma although it supported him strongly in the elections of 1999. This area of Ukraine is closest to the Ukrainian diaspora in the West. Ukrainian Canadians, for the most part, have their ancestry here in this former territory of the Austrian Empire, which was under Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania during the inter-war period.

The second area is Central Ukraine, including the western regions and the capital, Kiev. The capital is in the most prosperous region, and it has been the focus of Ukrainian nation building since 1991.

The third area is the Southern region, including Odessa, Mikhailev, Kherson and the Crimean Peninsula. It is a Russian- speaking region with enclaves of alienated populations. The situation there is not in any case close to civil conflict. Crimea, which was incorporated in 1954, has a Russian-speaking majority and, in fact, has a majority of Russians. It is the only part of Ukraine with a Russian majority. It also contains the Russian founded port of Sevastopol, which is mostly now leased to the Russian Black Sea fleet.

From this region comes the complex issue of the return of the Crimean Tartars deported by Stalin at the end of World War II. The Kiev government has supported the return of Tartars to this region, but the Tartars represent the most impoverished sector of the population anywhere in Ukraine.

The fourth area is Eastern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiev, Luhans'k. This region is a mixture of Ukrainians and Russians. However, the population is mainly Russian speaking. It is also the most sovietized region of Ukraine. It is also the centre of industrial and economic power and of oligarchical clans, about which I will say more in a moment. They are particularly in Dnipropetrovsk, favoured by the Kuchma government, and today, have a strong power base in Kiev as well. By contrast, the rival region of Donetsk, the old centre of the coal industry, is struggling and its industries are in deep decline.

A few general comments can be made about regionalism. In all the regions except the far west, there is no ethnic dissension, and even there, there has not been any conflict. There is little common ground, however, between Donetsk interests as a city and those of Levizje in the far west.

It is inevitable that key political figures have a foot in Eastern Ukraine because of its economic clout. At the same time, this area has been traditionally closer to the Russian Federation, by temperament and geographic proximity.

The leaders in that region have often voiced a kind of inferiority complex and resentment toward "real Ukrainians" in the West.

The second area that I will discuss is politics. It is fair to call what is happening today in Ukraine a political crisis. It began with a controversial referendum last April, which gave the president powers to dissolve the Parliament. Not surprisingly, it was not ratified by Parliament. There has been increasing control of the state over the media, including harassment of editors, the closure of opposition newspapers and persecution of individuals who have spoken out against the government.

The most infamous case is that of the Georgian-born journalist of Ukrainsk and editor of an Internet newsletter, Pravda Ukrainy, Hehiy Gongadze, who disappeared last September and is believed to be the headless corpse that was found in a forest outside Kiev two months later. The release of tapes by the former bodyguard of Kuchma, Melnychenko, implicates the president in the death of Gongadze. The release of those tapes led to mass protests especially in the capital, and mainly by students from Western Ukraine.

One feature of the tapes was their crudity and brutality: This from a President who was once thought of as a creditable statesman by most countries of the West. However, Kuchma has survived these protests, which have rarely reached mass levels. Only once, on March 9, did they descend into violence and bloodshed, when members of the far right faction, the UNA Unso, assaulted the Ukrainian militia.

Since then there has been a re-alignment of political forces in Ukraine. The Parliament made a decision late last month to reprimand the government over its economic performance, despite the fact that it is the first period of economic growth since independence. And the democratic-minded Prime Minister, Viktor Yushchenko has been dismissed. An alliance has been formed between the left and centre moderate, and even some of the right parties such as the Greens. However, neither the Rouk party nor the popular movement factions have joined the alliance.

The background to this conflict is a dispute over control of resources and the barter system. This system was profitable for individuals, but cut off vital sources of revenue for the government. Kuchma formed a kind of working alliance with the oligarchs, including his earlier Prime Minister Petro Lazarenko.

At the same time, Mr. Kuchma was facing obligations to the West and to the United States, for support. There has been continual pressure on the president to allow the system to continue. This led to the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, the former first Deputy Prime Minister responsible for energy. Tymoshenko then formed an alliance with Yuschenko, was imprisoned by Kuchma, and also became a focal point of the opposition movement.

The situation of Mr. Yuschenko is more complex. He is popular, quiet spoken, but to date has never formally allied himself with the opposition to the president. He is a strong opponent of one section of the opposition, the parliamentary leftists who are led by the communists. He is also much more moderate in his outlook than the student factions from Western Ukraine. The removal of Yuschenko opens up the possibility that he could unite the opposition to President Kuchma.

The third area that I will look at briefly is economy and energy. Ukraine has been a major disappointment in the post-Soviet period in that with its natural resources and rich farmland, it was thought that it would make rapid progress towards democracy and a market economy. Why has this not happened?

The first factor is the decline in natural resources and a failure in the Soviet period to re-profile major industries such as coal, iron and steel.

The second factor is the contraction of farmland through earlier industrial development and simultaneously, acute environmental damage caused by pollution, irrigation schemes and the effects of the Chernobyl disaster.

The third factor is the narrow control over key resources by "clans or factions" allied with the former party apparatus.

The fourth factor is the reluctance of the Kratschuk and then the Kuchma presidencies to embark on rapid economic reform and privatization. One facet of this has been the reluctance of rural dwellers to abandon the security of the collective farm system. The general decline of the Ukrainian village, which demographically has seen an aging population, has contributed to this problem as well.

The fifth factor is the reliance on Russia for certain resources, particularly oil and gas, which has often restricted Ukraine's initiative.

The sixth factor is the past alternative to Russian oil and gas, that of nuclear power, is no longer credible in full because of the consequences of Chernobyl. Ukraine's promise to close that station was fulfilled last December. There has also been international concern for the safety of Ukraine's remaining reactors. There has been no new program of nuclear power development in Ukraine since the 1980s, other than the fulfilment of construction that began in the Soviet period.

The seventh factor is the lack of state income. This has meant a failure to pay workers adequately, or even at all. The result has been a disaffection of the Ukraine workforce for the Kiev government. There have been frequent strikes and protests.

The eighth factor is the failure of Ukraine to convince European structures that it should be accepted as a legitimate member of the European Union. Ukraine has no prospects, currently, of even being an associate member of the union. However, important trading neighbours such as Poland and the Baltic States, have been accepted. This is already causing some problems for Ukraine, and particularly the prospect of VISA requirements on the borders.

This will certainly affect trade with Poland where much of the trade is unofficial and done over the borders. The Council of Europe has also frequently admonished Ukraine for a tax on human rights and threatened suspension and expulsion.

The ninth factor, which I will leave to the question period because it is too big to deal with here, is corruption at all levels.

The tenth and last factor is the dramatic decline in living and health standards since independence. The population drop in Ukraine is among the sharpest in Europe, from over 52 million people at the time of independence to only 49 million people today. This decline has been brought about mainly because of a rise in the death rate over the birth rate and the lack of any inflow of population from other regions.

The health care decline is the result of a lack of state support. Former diseases like tuberculosis have resurfaced. New diseases like AIDS and the consequences of the illegal use of drugs have emerged for the first time.

It all sounds bleak. I did not mean to give such a bleak picture. In conclusion, what can be done about the situation?

At present, the political structure is such that change can only come from the top. Initiative remains with the president butMr. Kuchma is not the sort of person to take risks. He is beset with political problems now and is unlikely to take major initiatives. A better system of taxation would help. A more open climate for western businesses and a tolerant attitude to the media would help as well. The emergence of a new leadership figure would also help. A person is needed who can gain the trust of key western structures such structures as the EU, the IMF, and regain the faith of Ukraine's key supporter, the United States.

The west can back reforms in Ukraine without alienating Russia. I do not see the Russian attitude towards Ukraine as predatory. Russia has not exploited the political crisis in Ukraine and has responded in very mild fashion to Kuchma's overtures.

There is no civil strife in Ukraine, unlike many former Soviet republics. The situation of the Parliament is flexible. The communists are no longer the guiding influence. There is plenty of opportunity for working alliances between democratic and centralist parties.

The extreme right in Ukraine is also very weak and has not been able to use this situation to its advantage. The key date is 2004, which is when the next presidential election will take place. The replacement of the corrupt Mr. Kuchma seems essential for further progress in Ukraine.

The question is whether the democratic forces can come up with a viable platform for change that can appeal to different sectors of the population. There is a plethora of different political parties with different outlooks in Ukraine. In many ways, this is healthy phenomenon. Concomitantly, it does tend to limit the scope of the government to adopt a firm platform in any one direction. Also to date, the large number of political parties and groups has restricted the opportunities for centralist and democrats to offer a viable alternative government that is completely independent of the old state structure of the past.

Mr. Bohdan Klid, Professor, Canadian Institute of Ukraini an Studies, University of Alberta: I would like to focus my talk largely on geopolitical issues. First, I will give you background on the impact and importance of Ukrainian independence.

Ten years ago, 15 new states arose from the ruins of an empire called the Soviet Union, altering profoundly the geopolitical constellation of the Eurasian landscape. Security analysts and scholars have recognized the critical importance of Ukraine's emergence as an independent country in this fundamental transformation.

First, an independent Ukraine has transformed what has traditionally been called Russia, that is, the Russian Empire. When Ukraine gained statehood, Russia lost direct control over a major industrialized and rich farming country with a territory and population roughly the size of France. From a strictly military standpoint, Ukraine's independence, in 1991, immediately de prived Russia of control over an 850,000-man army complete with its military equipment. All nuclear weapons located on its territory have subsequently been removed and long range missiles destroyed. Ukraine became the first country to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons.

In the longer term, Ukraine's independence has deprived Russia control over a sophisticated military industrial complex including cadres of highly qualified scientists and other trained specialists.

One well-known Sovietologist noted that soon after Ukraine's independence that without Ukraine, Russia would not be able it reconstruct itself as an empire. Maintaining Ukraine's indepen dence then was and remains a critical factor in Russia's transformation from empire to nation state. In the long run, this transformation, if successful, will enhance worldwide security.

Second, Ukraine's emergence as an independent state has contributed significantly to the process of redefining and transforming Europe. Its immediate effect was to enhance the security of its European neighbours - Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary. Poland and Hungary were quick to appreciate this, as they were the first two countries to recognize Ukraine's independence and establish diplomatic relations with it.

Ukraine, unlike Russia, has facilitated NATO's expansion to include some of Ukraine's direct neighbours. Moreover, in 1997, Ukraine signed a special partnership agreement with NATO formalizing its friendly disposition to EuroAtlantic security cooperation. The expansion of the European Union, or the new Europe that is now being created, has also largely been possible because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's independence.

The impact of Ukraine's independence has been likened to the recent integration of Germany into Europe. One scholar com menting on the importance of Ukraine in the new security environment of east central Europe characterized it as "the keystone in the arch."

While Ukraine's independence has resulted in short-term challenges and problems, it has also presented unparalleled long-term opportunities to consolidate the security of Europe on a more solid foundation. Ukraine's independence will transform Russia into a more or less normal nation-state, and bring democracy and economic prosperity to Eastern Europe and beyond.

I will speak about the challenges for the West and Russia. The main task for European-Atlantic policy makers vis-à-vis Ukraine will be to formulate policies towards Ukraine based not just on Ukraine's short-term successes in following through on reform commitments but on its overall importance to Europe's long-term security and stability. European-Atlantic countries should help Ukraine institute market reform and assist them in the consolida tion of its statehood. Ukraine also needs help to build a civil society and a democratic state.

In short, they should aim to make Ukraine more European, which means formulating long-term strategies and policies that envisage Ukraine as a partner. It should be recognized as a potential EU member. Steps should be taken, together with Ukraine, toward realizing that goal.

For Russia, the main challenge for its political elites has been, and continues to be, to accept Ukraine's independence as irreversible and to reject permanently the project of reconstructing the former imperial realm.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was presented with an opportunity to abandon its empire building and maintenance policies. These past policies had caused its own people and others a great deal of harm. It was an opportunity to turn inward, to develop its own vast resources and human capital. It was given an opportunity to construct a true federation and become a more or less normal nation state. If Russia travels along this path, it too should become part of the new European home.

Unfortunately, recent policies taken or not taken, as well as statements made by Western, Russian and Ukrainian leaders, suggest that the old ways of thinking remain strongly entrenched despite the new opportunities presented. The EU especially has not recognized the role that it could play as a catalyst and force for domestic reforms in Ukraine. This would also help cement Ukraine's statehood and geopolitical orientation. Recognizing that Ukraine's transformation is a difficult, lengthy and painful process, Ukraine needs assurances that the door to Europe will remain open, and that it will receive substantial support for market economy development, democratization, and the adoption of European standards. Instead, the EU's commitment to Ukraine has been ambiguous and lukewarm. It has been reluctant to consider Ukraine politically and culturally as a part of Europe.

Moreover, when comparing policies and attitudes towards Ukraine and Russia, European leaders have generally favoured Russia. It took the EU, for instance, almost four years to ratify the partnership and cooperation agreement negotiated in 1994. Although Ukraine's "European aspirations were acknowledged" at the December 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU plans to halt its expansion for the foreseeable future at Ukraine's borders. This re-establishes a dividing line in Europe that takes the place of the old Berlin wall and the iron curtain. This policy implies Europe's abandonment of Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence. It foreshadows the re-establishment of two opposing blocks in Europe, one more prosperous, democratic and stable in the West and the other an unpredictable, less stable, much poorer, authoritarian and perhaps vengeful grouping led by Russia in the East.

What is Russia's response? This scenario would be acceptable to Russian leaders who, although for the time being concede Ukraine's independence, for the most part still consider its appearance as a temporary phenomenon. Even a cursory examination of Russian policies towards Ukraine from 1991 shows they have consistently aimed at keeping Ukraine weak and dependent on Russia economically. Russia has especially taken advantage of their almost 80 per cent energy monopoly and the decisions of Ukraine's leaders who are dependent on approbation from Kremlin authorities. Russia's near-term goal is to turn Ukraine into a client state. Perhaps under more favourable circumstances in the future it will force Ukraine into a close reunion.

With Vladimir Putin as president, Russian now has an energetic leader but one whose vision of Russia's future is strongly informed by a Soviet especially KGB past. Since taking office, he has publicly praised the former Soviet Union, including the KGB, and he has made no secret of his aim to restore Russia's"greatness." Under his leadership, Russia has undertaken to impose a military solution to the question of Chechnya's status, which is fundamentally a political question. This has resulted in the indiscriminate killings of tens of thousands of civilians, the creation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the commis sion of systematic war crimes by Russia's military and security forces.

Mr. Putin has also recently cozied up to Iran, North Korea and China. There appears to be little doubt today as to what he means by restoring Russian "greatness."

Achievements and failures in Ukraine. Upon achieving formal independence in 1991, Ukraine faced the simultaneous challenges and extremely difficult tasks of state-building and nation-building that included the democratizing of both society and government, and the creation of a market economy. Achievements have occurred in all these areas. However, Ukraine's highly sovietized political elites have also countenanced or tolerated stalled or incomplete reforms, corruption in government and society, creeping authoritarianism, shady and semi-criminal economic practices, while presiding over plunging economic output and skyrocketing poverty levels.

Yet, despite ongoing problems and weaknesses, and the incomplete and perhaps stalled nature of its transition, Ukraine has remained a relatively stable and fairly democratic country in a largely authoritarian, troubled and violent neighbourhood of the former Soviet space. Its international behaviour, in contrast to that of Russia, has been "civilized and predictable." However, Ukraine's stability remains fragile, as there are serious underlying social tensions, regional differences, as well as ethnic and language divisions.

An unfolding audiotape scandal involving Ukraine's president Leonid Kuchma, has thrown Ukraine into a several-month-long political crisis that could result in the destabilization of the country.

As well, a recently pronounced pro-Russian tilt in Kiev's policies gives cause for concern as to the Kiev geopolitical orientation. Last October, Ukraine's pro-western foreign minister was fired because he was unacceptable to Moscow.

The current crisis has thrown into the spotlight Ukraine's problems, failures and the increasingly authoritarian actions of its president, but it has also highlighted the inadequate, uncoordi nated and ambivalent nature of European countries' attitudes and policies towards Ukraine. The EU especially has maintained, at best, a lukewarm attitude toward Ukraine's aspirations for EU membership. Yet the expansion of the EU and NATO to Ukraine's borders leaves it no good alternative but to move closer to Europe. The alternative, reintegration with Russia, would reverse economic reforms and strengthen authoritarian trends in both Ukraine and Russia and undermine Ukrainian statehood. A failing state at the EU's borders would present substantial security risks internally as well as to Ukraine's neighbours. It is in the EU and the Euro-Atlantic community's interests, then, that this does not happen and to support Ukraine's European geopolitical orienta tion.

To conclude, the emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991 presented the Euro-Atlantic community with an unprecedented opportunity to resolve longstanding continental divisions and antagonisms. Ukraine occupies a geostrategic location at the crossroads of Europe between East and West. As such, it should be viewed as a bridge to Russia and beyond. Policies should not be enacted which would exclude it from Europe, treat it as a buffer zone, or consign it to a Russian sphere of influence.

While we may tend to be discouraged by what has transpired in Ukraine, these developments underscore the need for a coherent, coordinated assistance strategy and long-term commitments from the Euro-Atlantic countries, including Canada. The focus of support should be not only on economic reform but should include strong assistance for Ukraine's nation-building and state-building efforts.

Aid to civil society groups and organizations that encourage democratic practices and citizen participation should be increased. If we recognize that the sovietization of Ukrainian society is a problem, the focus on nation-building efforts should be on Ukraine's youth and educational sectors. While recognizing our limitations, Canada could spearhead significant student and scholarly exchange programs with Ukraine's institutions of secondary and higher education and encourage joint projects and cooperative ventures between Canadian and Ukrainian scientific and research bodies. As British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli once remarked "In establishing foreign policy goals, Britain had no permanent friends, only permanent interests". Bearing in mind Ukraine's geopolitical importance, Canada and the other Euro-At lantic countries should act in their long-term interests to help Ukraine succeed in its difficult and painful transition. Canada should help Ukraine to consolidate its statehood and become a full-fledged member of the European and Euro-Atlantic commun ity of nations.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Senator Grafstein: When one examines the history of Ukraine, one discovers that it really has only been independent prior to the recent period for four years in its long history. Yet, despite the lack of nationhood, it in effect has been a nation within a larger sphere. There is a cultural affinity amongst Ukrainian people through culture and so on.

Both of you paint a very dismal picture of the current status of Ukraine. Yet when one visits Ukraine, as I have, I am taken by the fact that the population is intelligent. There does not seem to be deep ethnic divisions, as you find in other parts of Europe. There are some, but they are not as deep. Perhaps you might talk about that for a moment. When you examine the cultural history of the region or the land mass known as Ukraine, you find that they were leaders in art, in culture and in music. There seems to be a disconnect between that cultural excellence and the ability to create a civil society based on democratic forms. Look at Poland, which is a neighbour with a similar landmass, sister languages, sister roots, and it has moved dramatically ahead while Ukraine has not.

I will give one example. There has been a huge debate at the OSCE for the last two or three years as to whether or not Ukraine should be expelled. The debate was based on the principle that Ukraine had retained the death penalty. I am not sure if that it is the case today. It is a precondition to joining the EU, that the death penalty not be the policy of any member.

The Chairman: The Council of Europe?

Senator Grafstein: The Council of Europe. OSCE has followed the same principle. There is a huge debate as to whether or not Ukraine should be expelled. They gave the government a period of time to remove the death penalty.

Having said that, there is this disconnect. As senators listen to the evidence, we hear fabulous stories about this "cultural disconnect."

I know from both your backgrounds that you have studied not only the history and economic aspects of Ukraine, but also the social and cultural aspects of the Ukrainian culture. Could you explain the huge disconnect? Why have they not been able to emerge as the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have?

Mr. Marples: That is a valid question. There are a number of different aspects to this question. The first thing I thought of when you were presenting your opening remarks was that Ukraine is closely tied to the intricacies of the Soviet system. That was not the case, for example, with Poland.

Poland was a unique case in the Cold War. It was a nation that was never really part of the Warsaw Pact. It had certain advantages that the other countries lacked. Post-war Poland is the most homogenous country in Europe. It is 96 per cent Polish. There is an absolute contrast to the pre-war period when Poland had large minority populations. It is also 96 per cent Roman Catholic. The church has always been a major unifying factor in Poland.

Having said that, the Poles took a big risk when they implemented what they called "shock therapy". For a few years the population went through a great deal of suffering in order to be at the point where they are today.

For a number of reasons that has not happened in Ukraine. The first president of Ukraine, Mr. Kravchuk, was less concerned with economic change than simply solidifying the state. He perceived that there was a serious Russian threat to Ukrainian independence. In his view, it was important to preserve the state and start to build a nation before taking part in economic reform.

This was probably the reason why he was replaced in 1994 with Kuchma. By that time, the population was tired with the drop in living standards and wanted to move forward. Kuchma promised a number of things in his electoral manifestos. Since then he has spoken about pushing market reform, privatizing, and ending corruption. However, in practice, very little has been done.

One tended to get more and more cliques and factions in the government, more so than during the previous president's period. Kravchuk was after all a native western Ukrainian and did not have a foot hold with the great industrial groups from the east.

I focused quite a bit on regionalism because that is a factor. We have tremendous regionalism in Canada, but we are much older as a nation. We have learned to work out some of the problems and some we have not.

It is still the early days for Ukraine. It is only 10 years since independence and seven years into the Kuchma presidency, Mr. Kuchma is supposedly geared towards economic change.

Both Mr. Klid and I mentioned corruption as a factor. The corruption at the highest levels of society is the biggest impediment to progress in Ukraine. The situation is the same in Russia. However, in Ukraine it seems to be worse because it is at the very highest levels. It seems to impede the whole process.

Mr. Klid: It is always useful to make comparisons. In this case, we need to look at the Soviet Union. Poland had the inter-war period when it was an independent country and was more firmly planted in Europe. Poland was safe from the Stalinist period prior to World War Two. The Baltic countries, although part of the Soviet Union after World War Two, have also made tremendous strides compared to the other Soviet states.

Compare Ukraine with Russia and the other post-Soviet republics and you can see a difference in attitude toward reform. This attitude also changes from region to region. If you look at western Ukraine, for example, the population there is closer to what we would call a civil society. They are more politically active and more nationalistic. They also have a higher level of political consciousness and were the driving force behind Ukraine's independence.

The further east you go, the more sovietized the population is. If you go to the heartland of Russia and into the central Asian republics, you see even worse situations. Although it is useful to compare Ukraine with Poland, a comparison with Russia probably gives us a better understanding of the way that things are.

The Chairman: May I ask a question at this point? This follows Senator Grafstein's question. I was speaking to my Ukrainian neighbour the other day. She was born in Galicia. I asked her if the current government in Ukraine is a Dnieperian government or a Galician government? She immediately said that it is a Dnieper government. She said that Galicians are not represented.

She told me an interesting story. She was born in Ukraine. She was a German forced labourer and receives a pension from that government. She explained the state of religion and society in her area until the beginning of World War II. It was very interesting. I felt that she took very seriously the fact that Galicia had been Austrian for over 100 years, until the end of World War I. Dnieper, Ukraine had been Russian, of course.

She is a supporter of Ukraine. She is not an anti-Ukrainian. She is not a person with unusual views.

I would like to know your opinion. Why is it that so many members of the government seem to come from the same town in Dneiper, Ukraine? I would like to hear a bit about that.

Mr. Marples: As you probably know, Dneiper Petrovsk is named after a famous communist leader. Even by the name, if sounds like a communist city. The name has not been dropped which gives us some indication of the political sentiment in the area.

Senator Grafstein: The statue of Lenin is still there.

Mr. Marples: There is a significant difference between the different regions. What you said in your outline is true, but it is also slightly dangerous and slightly problematic. Galician Ukraine is, despite being politically advanced is economically, one of the weakest parts of Ukraine. It is the least industrialized area and is the slowest area to change.

There you have, paradoxically, the most politically enlightened population in the weakest economic area. The situation elsewhere is absolutely vice versa. The most hardline people who will not change are in the key economic resource regions.

I do not think it is feasible to have a government dominated by Galicians. It is not possible and it would alienate most of the rest of the country. It would be like a Canadian Parliamentary cabinet full of Albertans. You need to have a combination. There needs to be much tolerance and understanding of both sides, not just one for the other, but of both.

For the moment, it has to be accepted that many Ukrainians will continue to speak Russian. It may be a factor that it will change slowly at the younger levels, but the older generation, the ones over 40, will not change. If anything, they will be even more adamant than they were before. If they think they are being forced to change on the grounds that they are being "ukrainianized" the change will come even more slowly. One sees the phrase ukrainianized more frequently in places like Crimea and Luhans'k.

The Chairman: There is a division, still.

Mr. Klid: In politics, those who are where the power population bases are determine what sort of government is elected and who occupies the top positions in that government. It is no different in Ukraine. The central regions and the industrialized regions, where there is a large population base, have an overwhelming majority of government members.

There are some regional differences among them as well. There is a Kiev-based political group, a Donetsk-based political group and a Dnipropetrovsk-based group The Dnipropetrovsk group, along with some allies from the Kiev group, has been in power with Mr. Kuchma for some time now. Then, at times it is the Donetsk group who allies with the Dnipropetrovsk group, but it has been left out of the picture for the most part.

You are quite right about divisions concerning the language question. There is a language divide between East and West Ukraine. Some troublesome events have taken place. One example is from Western Ukraine where a singer was killed in a pub because he was singing Ukrainian songs. A Russian-speaking youth beat him up. After this incident there were huge demonstrations by Ukrainians demanding retaliatory measures. These sorts of things come up, but I do not think that the language issue is really the key issue in Ukraine right now.

The key issue is whether the country will remain stable and form a new government that will push the reform agenda forward. The issue of the geopolitical orientation of the country and whether it will remain westward looking, while not alienating Russia is also very important. Ukraine needs to march towards joining Europe. We do not know whether the Europeans and the West, in general, will support that orientation with real concrete aid and support.

Senator Di Nino: There are two issues I would like to explore further. One arises out of a comment made by Professor Klid. I believe that you said, not withstanding other things, that there is a stable and relatively democratic government in Ukraine.

The Council of Europe demands that its membership support a democratic system, the rule of law and also support human rights. There has been some very strong criticism directed toward Ukraine and the impression that I have is that they do not believe Ukraine to be a stable and democratic country. Therefore, I would like a further explanation on that subject. Perhaps Professor Marples could comment. Both of you, at different times, have discussed the regional differences. Could you discuss whether there are any major differences of opinion between those at a later stage of life and the younger people?

Mr. Klid: I will explain what I meant. You have to compare Ukraine with its post-Soviet neighbours. Look at Russia and the events there. The war in Chechnya has resulted in tens of thousands of Russia's own citizens being slaughtered. There have been bombings, kidnappings and torture. These acts have been documented by western sources, the Russians themselves, and by independent human-rights groups.

One must make comparisons. How does Ukraine look when compared with Russia? How does it compare with Moldova, which had a civil war in the early 1990s? Look for a comparison with Azerbaijan, which had a war with Armenia. Or look at Georgia, which also had a civil war. In 1993 there were tanks in the streets of Moscow. There were crazy men like Zhirinovski running around.

Further east, it is even worse, because in Central Asia, there are the autocratic Turkmenbashi. If you compare Ukraine with the rest of the countries in the post-Soviet space, then you can say that compared with the others, Ukraine seems to be not a bad place.

If you compare Ukraine with Western Europe or with its Central and Eastern European neighbours, then, certainly, Ukraine lags behind. In the last several years, especially since 1998, things have been bad. Certainly, in the case of freedom of the press, or in the case of using the state to silence opponents, the Kuchma regime has certainly become more authoritarian. This is a worrisome situation.

On the other hand, the Council of Europe has now decided that Ukraine is a "bad boy." Well, the Council of Europe, in January of this year, reinstated Russia's voting rights. Russia had been suspended for its war in Chechnya. How can one credit the Council of Europe with being even-handed, or with being less than hypocritical, when it votes to expel Ukraine and not Russia? I would like to stress that the policy be even-handed and that it not be hypocritical. The Council of Europe has discredited itself. That is not to say that Ukraine does not deserve to be criticized, because it does.

Mr. Marples: One could probably say that there are certain tendencies in the post-Soviet states that seem to be fairly applicable to all of them except for the Baltic republics. There has been, since independence, a general conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature. In every case, the executive and the president, have come out on top. Inevitably, the Parliament has been weakened, and in some cases it has been weakened fatally. As a result, you have a number of very authoritarian-type regimes. In my view, Ukraine fits into this pattern. Certainly Belarus does as well. That is the archetype of this system. I think Russia does also. Russia resolved that problem with tanks. Therefore, it resorted to force to solve its problem. Ukraine did not need to do that because the president already had the powers at his disposal to curtail the Parliament. I might differ a bit with Dr. Klid on this subject. I do not think Ukraine is a democratic country.

Sometimes I think it might be very difficult for many countries to get into the Council of Europe. I do not think the United States would qualify, for example, should it want to get into the Council of Europe.

Having said that, I do not think that Ukraine is markedly different from Russia. That is my opinion, and we may disagree on that one.

I do think you are correct about generational differences. I have not done any kind of sociological survey on this subject. I am speaking off the top of my head, but once the student group joins the general workforce, it seems to be more compliant with the existing system and the existing government and even with the values of the older generation. You do really notice that the students speak with a different voice. I do not think that is necessarily confined to one region or another. I think that is applicable across Ukraine.

Mr. Klid: I am sorry I did not address that second point. There are generational differences. It is a commonplace saying that the future lies with the youth. Ukraine's youth has shown that, even in the last two or three months. They are the ones who have gone into the streets to protest Mr. Kuchma and to support an investigation of the murder of the journalist Gongadze. I think that is a very hopeful sign. That is why I think that Canada's aid to Ukraine should be focused, to a large degree, on helping build a civil society and on supporting the process of democratization. Ukraine's youth is certainly one of the key factors in this.

Senator Austin: I am interested in one question. That question concerns the visit of President Putin to President Kuchma that took place a few weeks ago. I am interested in your comments with respect to their agenda and the purposes of the meeting. Some items were economic while others were political. The view of some commentators are that President Putin came to Ukraine to reinforce the Kuchma presidency while at the same time to deliver a message to his opposition in that country. It sounds like I know what I am talking about, but this is really is a question to both of you. You have both made comments concerning the significance of the Russia-Ukraine relationship and the dotted line between Ukraine and Europe and the West. The meeting seemed to send messages. Asking the question directly, do you have a view of Russia's view of where Ukraine should fit in its foreign policy interests?

Mr. Marples: Stalin used to say "there is no accident." It is therefore, no accident that Putin turned up in Kiev in the middle of a political crisis. I think it is fair enough to say that. Russia is in a very interesting period right now. Mr. Putin has, through creation of governorships and other things, focused on the centralization of Russia. He has been cutting down on regional autonomy. One would have thought that in this situation, it is not really in Russia's interests to get involved in external political conflicts. I noted that in Belarus, for example, Mr. Lukashenko is furiously trying to get Putin's endorsement of his presidential election campaign. Putin has refused to do endorse him. Belarus is closer to Russia than Ukraine is. For that reason, I do not think Russia is playing a key political role, at the moment, in the political crisis in Ukraine.

Having said that, I think Russia is very concerned that if Kuchma should fall, the new president would be more oriented to the West. If you look at the possible alternatives to Kuchma, the first names that spring to mind are Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. Both those candidates are firmly opposed to Kuchma. Apart from the rag bag communist group, there are so many them that it is hard to pick out any individual, those two are the main figures that the West notices.

I do not think Putin would be very well disposed towards Yushchenko taking over as president of Ukraine. When Yushchen ko was chairman of the national bank he pushed for market reform in Ukraine. He is certainly the most popular and democratic leader of all the leaders in Ukraine. In that respect, it makes sense for Putin, so far as he can, to keep Kuchma in power. My own view is that he is not giving 100 per cent effort to this. It is not his prime area right now. He cannot ignore it either because Ukraine is important to Russia.

Senator Bolduc: When you say that Ukraine is very important for Russia, is that because of resources or because of access to the Black Sea? Why is it important?

Mr. Marples: For one thing, Ukraine is Russia's main trading partner and Russia is the main trading partner of Ukraine. That has been the case since independence, even though that has dropped off a bit and Russia now has a number of different trading partners. Politically, Russia has strategic interests in Ukraine. It has always been concerned about that border area. We talked about the EU expansion, but there is also the factor of NATO expansion. NATO expanding to the eastern border of Poland renders Ukraine immediately very important to Russian security interests. That is now, in effect, the border between NATO and what we can call the CIS, for want of a better word.

There are many more reasons. We could argue about how important they are. Historically, there is the Russian mindset, the attitude of Russians to Ukraine and the loss of Ukraine, et cetera. Add to that the question of the Orthodox Church community. There are a number of these things.

However, I do not think Putin thinks in these terms. Putin thinks like a KGB man.

In this case, his attitude is that he will keep Kuchma there if it is possible to do so. He will not give anything to Kuchma nor will he threaten anyone. He will simply give Kuchma a pat on the back.

Senator Bolduc: Suppose that Mr. Putin has an interest there and also has interest in the independent, wealthy, eastern states. In your opinion, how will he behave, if he has to make a choice?

Senator Austin: I would like you to think about that answer while Professor Klid answers me. Unfortunately, I have to catch a plane to Vancouver. I should like to have your views.

Mr. Klid: Certainly. Kuchma's weaknesses and problems are favourable to Russia in the short-term, at least. Kuchma's problems play into Russia's hands in the sense that Russia can now either offer support to Kuchma or withdraw support from him. Russia has that choice.

In that sense, it strengthens Russia's hand. Kuchma, regardless of whether he receives Russian support or not, is domestically weaker in Ukraine because of this crisis and because of the scandal of the tapes.

Russia has a number of interests in Ukraine including economic interests. They are interested in keeping Ukraine as energy dependent as possible so that they can continue to use the energy card to influence policy in Ukraine. They also have strategic interests, as were mentioned.

With Ukraine as an ally, Russia is that much stronger and can use that weight against Europe if it must. Without Ukraine, of course, Russia must think differently. I think that is where the key question lies, because with Ukraine, Russia has an extra 49 million or 50 million people. The Ukrainian resources and military and industrial complexes are available to them.

Ukraine produces one of the best tanks in the world. Nikita Khrushchev said that Ukraine used to build rockets like sausages. Without that military-industrial complex, Russia is much weaker.

Senator Austin: What is the size of the Russian minority in Ukraine? Where is it located?

Mr. Klid: The Russian minority is located largely in the East, but also in the South and Southeast. The official statistic is that about 21 per cent or 22 per cent of the population is Russian.

Mr. Marples: Eleven million people.

The Chairman: There are millions of Ukrainians who live in Russia.

Mr. Marples: There are also intermarriages between Russians and Ukrainians.

The Chairman: The Ukrainian ethnic area then, goes quite clearly into Russia and Kazakhstan.

Senator Austin: I am looking for your reaction as to whether the Russian minority in Ukraine plays any role in the Ukraine- Russia political relationship. Are they a factor?

Mr. Marples: I would argue that, for the most part, the only real evidence of that has been in the Crimea, and only in the early post-independence years. Russians in Ukraine do not act or think like the Russians in Russia. It is unthinkable that you would go into a room and ask who is Ukrainian and who is Russian. No one would even think about it. It would not be a factor.

The incident of the murder of the musician was so unusual in many ways that it made headlines. Incidents like that one are not common. The fact it happened there is particularly astonishing because that area is one where Russians are less represented.

Mr. Marples: My opinion is that the eastern resources are critical to Russia, particularly the resources of western Siberia and the two other eastern regions. If any of those regions tried a bid for independence it would be of great concern to Mr. Putin. It would be more important to him than the state of affairs in Ukraine.

It is not an unusual thing to anticipate. For example, much to the horror of Putin, the capital of Tartarstan has already begun to introduce the Latin alphabet. The alphabet is being introduced in the schools. That republic is only about 45 per cent Tartar yet they are pushing for their own autonomy.

The Chairman: I missed that point about the Latin alphabet.

Mr. Marples: The capital of Tartarstan has begun to introduce the Latin alphabet. Putin, at the same time, is trying to centralize the regions. For resources like diamonds, oil, gas, platinum and other things, Siberia, is critical to the Russians.

Another factor is that Putin wants to keep European trade open. Germany is a key partner for Russia now. It makes a lot of sense for that partnership to have stability in the countries that are in between them. I mean particularly in Poland, Belarus and Ukraine.

Senator Andreychuk: I will not take long as I have already had time to speak with our witnesses. I will start with a comment.

Ukraine, when it was part of the Soviet Union, was unusual in that between the First World War and the Second World War there was political activity there. The political activity was strongest in the west. That is where the famine occurred. Eight million people perished. When you look at the makeup of the modern day Ukraine you see Crimea, and the east and the west. There was a transplanting of people. That 20 per cent were not traditionally always there. There was a lot of movement. That was one Stalin's political moves.

It has been difficult to find out what the nation of Ukraine would be like. We were all rather surprised that they did pay attention to the multi-cultural aspects of the country. They tried to include the Crimean Republic by making overtures before the last election to give some autonomy to support the Tartars coming back. Those are all the positive things that seemed to happen on the social side.

The difficulty has been that there has been no economic benefit for the people. The reforms have not moved. You mentioned the fact that the executive has had the advantage over the legislative branch. I think that is well known.

The russification of this area was intense. I can recall that in Soviet Union times the Russian leaders did not know how to approach the "stans" because of their Islamic base and cultural differences. They had an affinity with Ukraine and felt they could control it more easily than the other areas.

That is all background.

My concern now is the role of the oligarchs in supporting the executive, which seems to be different than in Russia. Could you comment on that? What is the role of the security police, who were replaced, in the control of Ukraine? How does President Kuchma fit into all of that? What is the role of the military? They have a partnership for peace and seem to be rather open to Canada and NATO. Those are the aspects that I am trying to understand.

Mr. Klid: Your remarks about Ukraine's history in the 20th century are certainly something that we have to keep in mind. It has had a tragic and difficult history. Ukraine is having a hard time changing because it has endured all these terrible tragedies.

You mentioned the migrations of people. There was the settlement of Crimea by Russians in the post-World War II era, the forced deportation of the Tartars, the forced deportation of Ukrainian peasants to Siberia and collectivization. It is a litany of one tragedy after another. When Ukraine emerged as an independent country they had to deal with building a state. The Russians already had a state and the centre was in Moscow. Ukraine however, needed to build her own state with its own centre. In essence, they had to start from scratch.

The other aspect is nation building. How do you go about building a state with such a legacy and with these problems?Mr. Marples mentioned that the Crimean Tartars have now been invited to settle back in the Crimea. However, the Ukrainian state does not have the resources to help them get their feet on the ground and to really help them economically to make their homes in Crimea. Many of them live in very difficult conditions.

Ukraine is encountering a great deal of difficulties on many different levels. You have to look to the Soviet legacy to understand how deep these roots are.

In respect to the oligarchs, Putin has gained some fame in the West. He is supposedly putting the Russian oligarchs in their place. One of the oligarchs exiled is Berezovsky and another is Gusinsky. Gusinsky is the owner of one of the most critical media outlets in Russia.

The Chairman: He was born in Ukraine, was he not?

Mr. Klid: I do not know. You probably know better than I do. The point is he has gone after such a person as Gusinsky, the owner of an independent national television station that was the most critical of the government. Immediately, a red flag comes up. Why has he not gone after another oligarch? If Putin really wants to destroy the power of the oligarchs, he should treat them equally. However, he is going after them selectively. So that process is still not clear.

I would think that Putin is trying to consolidate power. By getting rid of the most dangerous oligarchs, the other ones will fall into line. I believe that is what Mr. Putin is doing.

The situation in Ukraine is a bit different. The oligarchs have amassed a considerable amount of power, and they were instrumental in dumping the central government.

The oligarchs can do one of two things. They can continue to rob the state of its assets and steal whatever they can to amass greater fortunes. Or, they can try to become legitimate busines smen and legalize the shadow economy. Hopefully they will choose the latter.

To start a war with the oligarchs is a dangerous business, because many things are called into question. Let us say that certain privatizations have taken place. Will the government now reverse the situation and say that the privatized company was gained illegally? That it was purchased on the cheap or that someone was bribed to get the company for 10 cents on the dollar? Then they could demand a return of the business, and the businessman could be arrested.

There is a problem that the new Ukraine government will have to face. The oligarchs have a large amount of political power now, or at least a significant amount of political power. The best policy would be to try to bring the shadow economy into the legal economy. For the sake of social peace, the oligarchs should be converted into good solid businessmen, and they should work for the benefit of the Ukrainian economy. The oligarchs should invest their money in the Ukrainian economy to get people working and to start the economy rolling.

Mr. Marples: The real problem with the oligarchs is that they are, by their very nature, self-interested. They are not really working for the benefit of the country. They are interested in amassing power and wealth. Their accumulated wealth is not being recirculated for the benefit of the general economy.

The difference, perhaps, in Russia is that the oligarchs seem to be markedly anti-government. That has not always been the case. Former President Yeltsin had a very close working alliance with them. He himself amassed a personal fortune in his period in office. In my view, he was probably the most corrupt leader in the entire world during the peak of his presidency.

Senator Bolduc: He was a second Brezshnyv.

Mr. Marples: Putin is not in any kind of alliance with the oligarchs. In that respect, it might be a good thing. The fact is that Putin is tending to muzzle the media. However, the question is where does he start if he wants to go after the oligarchs? At the moment, Mr. Kuchma is seen by one group as their man in Kiev. If he goes too far in one direction, he will upset them. If he stays with them, everything will be fine. It is unfortunate, but I think that is the way it is. Yushenko would pose a bigger threat, because he is not identified with any particular group. It is a dangerous situation for a leader of a country to be closely affiliated with organized criminal networks. Former Prime Minister Lazarenko, is still awaiting trial in the United States and is wanted by the government of Switzerland for his affiliation with organized crime.

At the same time, the oligarchs are the creators of wealth, and they are the group that has benefited most from privatization. There are some very rich people in Ukraine. About 5 per cent of the population is richer than the wealthiest Canadians. This5 per cent live like Hollywood movie stars. That is how the wealth has been distributed. Perhaps that is the way it will be in the post-Soviet world. You will not see an egalitarian, or more liberal, distribution of wealth.

Senator Andreychuk: Do you have any comments on the military and the security police?

Mr. Klid: Ukraine has cooperated with NATO and has certainly been a leading member among the former Soviet countries to do so. It has even favoured NATO expansion.

The military has downsized since independence. It inherited an army of about 850,000 men, and I think the plan is to get the army down to about a quarter million. I think they are close to achieving that goal now. Another problem they face is what to do with all the ex-military men who no longer have jobs.

The problems that Ukraine faces are acute and complex. It is surprising that it has remained fairly stable even though there are these underlying tensions. There is only so much grinding poverty and social disparity that a population can take before some spark will set something off. That is the danger in Ukraine.

Mr. Marples: The evidence suggests the president and security police have worked very closely together. The security chief was the first casualty during the Gongadze scandal. He appears to have been present at many of these tape recordings. The recordings do seem to be genuine. At the very least, the voices of Kuchma and his former security chief are to be heard on the tapes. How the tapes were put together is another issue.

Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. It was one of the four nuclear states of the post-Soviet era. It was very generous to give up that position and to voluntarily give up weapons to Russia. Its emphasis is more on a conventional army. However, there are no immediate military threats to Ukraine. The deployment of that force is not necessary, and probably Ukraine does not need an army of more than 250,000. It is difficult to see where it would be used if it had such an army.

Despite the fact it is caught in the middle of two blocks, I do not see security problems for Ukraine at the present time.

Senator Corbin: My question is obvious and begs to be asked. Tell us all about corruption. Who is it? Where is it? Has it increased or decreased? Is it a domestic, foreign or expatriate problem?

Mr. Marples: I wish I knew all about it. Although there are different sources for this corruption the origins lie in Ukraine's natural resource regions. If you have a viable natural resource, that is where the corruption starts. Beginning in the late period of Gorbachev, it became evident that the state was about to collapse. The question on everyone's mind was who would control all the resources once Gorbachev was removed.

The Communist Party, already in control of the resources, had a foot in the door. During the privatization period, the former communists had a big advantage as they were part of the established hierarchy.

At the same time, evidence seems to suggest that they formed an alliance with the former black marketeers. This alliance clearly stretched beyond the borders of Ukraine. There were and still are links, for example, with countries like Cyprus, Crimea and certainly with other countries through the West. The central Asian states and the Caucasus are involved in the smuggling of drugs. There is a movement of people, both refugees and other types who are trying to get into Europe via Ukraine. These people come from the Middle East and central Asia. This is a phenomenon of the post-Soviet period.

Corruption is found on so many different levels that it is difficult to know where to begin. Clearly, the government has to keep in mind the interests of these various groups and the powerful figures that lead them. The government is limited in the amount of control it has over its own resources. The powerful interested parties must be consulted before decisions are made. For example, if you want to start exporting iron ore to South America, it is not a simple matter of agreeing to do it. The person or group who controls the iron ore and who controls the factory has to be consulted first. It is a very complex network.

The word "Mafia," often used in this connection, is perhaps a suitable word. There are links between the Ukrainian Mafia and the Russian Mafia. The Russian Mafia is more powerful and better established. In Ukraine, I would argue, the Mafia is more closely tied to the government. There the Mafia has reached into much higher levels of the government. This has taken place since the post-Yeltsin period.

Senator Prud'homme: May I ask a supplementary question? I will put it in French so that it is clear. As the first Canadian observer for the first election in Ukraine, twice under Foreign Affairs Minister Ouellet, I went around to many places. I came to the conclusion that sometimes we talk a lot about corruption.

[Translation]

I am about to conclude that the corrupted and the corruptors are not necessarily in the same countries. What I find very disturbing, in all the discussions between scholars around this table, is this difference between corrupted and corruptors.

I think we could easily conclude that there are a lot of corruptors on the West side to help what we could call the "corrupted."

[English]

The Chairman: I am not sure Senator Prud'homme asked a question.

Senator Prud'homme: He can comment on that. It goes with what he just said.

The Chairman: He made an observation. I do not know if any one wants to respond to it.

Mr. Marples: I think it is an astute observation. Corruption is a difficult topic to deal with. I will think about it and perhaps comment later.

Mr. Klid: The culture of corruption has its roots in the Soviet period. I spent a year in the former Soviet Union. I was there from 1987 to 1988, and during that time I was involved in corrupting someone. My wife is Ukrainian and once was a Soviet citizen. She was hospitalized for about a week. Soviet medicine is supposed to be free. It is free in theory, but in practice it is not. One is expected to bring a gift to the doctor. My wife told me that this is customary.

I finally figured it out. These doctors were making between 100 and 200 rubles a month, whereas coal miners were making 600 or 700 rubles a month. How do the doctors supplement their income? They get gifts from their patients. That is a form of corruption.

Another common form of corruption is found in the univer sities. During the Soviet period students who wanted to go to medical school would have to bribe the dean in order to do so.

Senator Prud'homme: Go to the big stuff now.

Mr. Klid: The guys at the top were doing more interesting things. I read a book in the 1980s on the issue of Soviet ecology. I read that some generals went on a hunting party. It was, in reality, actually a drinking binge. They went into a nature reserve, got drunk, and with machine guns shot up innocent ducks and geese. They were able to get away with this because the system was already corrupted.

These people had power and there was no control over how they exercised their power. If they wanted to commit arbitrary acts such as the one I have just described, they could do so and get away with it. They could demand that their underlings do favours for them.

In this type of system, it was I scratch your back, you scratch my back. That is the way things worked there. Corruption was endemic.

In the post-Soviet period the controls that had existed disappeared. The corruption now is at the highest levels. Billions of dollars are skimmed. They play the game well. They have offshore accounts where they hide their money.

Senator Grafstein: I would like to change the subject to some geopolitical questions that we have not discussed. You will recall that back in 1919 or 1920, the great geopolitical strategist Mackinder wrote an interesting strategic analysis of control of the heartland of Europe. "He who controls the heartland of Europe, which includes the flat land of Ukraine, will in fact control Europe." That is still a valid geopolitical conclusion, and I will not go further into that. However, it is an important preface.

Having said that, the Americans made a strategic decision, not too long ago. Professor Klid commented on it. They decided that they would support, through a private consortium, a pipeline from the Crimea towards the north and towards Turkey as opposed to deciding that they would use the landline from the Crimea through central Ukraine and into Europe. That was a geopolitical decision of great strategic import.

You indicated in an article here that U.S. errs by not supporting Ukraine's pipeline plans. I would like you to comment on that question, both of you, please. Also, tell us about the relationship between Ukraine and Turkey.

We have talked about the horseshoe and the relationship between Russia and Belarus and with Germany for strategic reasons. We have talked about the relationship with Poland and the West. We have not talked about Romania or Moldova.

Please give us your insight into how Turkey views the strategic relationship with Ukraine. As you do that, please tell us why the United States decided strategically on the Turkish line that would need both land and sea for transportation and not on the land line route through Europe.

Mr. Klid: I wrote a longer article on that. I will be glad to send that to you by e-mail or by post.

The United States is interested in diversifying its energy supplies. Oil has been discovered in the Caspian Sea basin and in Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan is a key there also because there is an existing pipeline going north through Chechnya through to the Black Sea coast. The Russians were pushing for this pipeline to be the main pipeline to supply oil to other markets.

Senator Bolduc: In other words, through Russia.

Mr. Klid: Yes. Part of the reason for the war in Chechnya is that the Chechens wanted a cut and the Russians claimed it all for themselves. That is a simplification of the matter.

The other pipeline is a direct line from Baku through Georgia to the Black Sea coast. This line was the one that was favoured by Ukraine. It was completed, I believe, in 1999. Since that time, between 5 million tonnes or 10 million tonnes a year are exported from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Black Sea coast. It is then loaded on to tankers. Once through Dardanelles it is ready for the Mediterranean market.

Ukrainians are building a pipeline from Odessa that will connect to a pipeline running from Russia. It will travel through Ukraine and supply oil to Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Ukraine wanted to connect to that pipeline so it could purchase oil coming from Georgia and bring it up through Europe.

I wrote about this plan. I suggested that the U.S. should support this route, which would help Ukraine diversify its energy supplies. It is a land and sea route. The Americans want the pipeline to go through Azerbaijan, cut in through Georgia and then south through Turkey. Then the main export point would be a port on the Mediterranean.

It will cost a lot of money to build this pipeline. I think that the oil companies are reluctant to build it because they know that it is expensive. Also, the pipeline is planned to go through a seismically sensitive area.

Mr. Klid: In Turkey, there is a problem between the Kurds and the Turks. Based on those three issues, the pipeline's viability is questionable. In addition, it would have to be filled with a substantial amount of oil to make it economical. Also, the line is quite long.

The U.S. supports that for strategic reasons. Why? It supports their ally Turkey. It lets the Turks earn some revenue from transport. It brings the oil into the Mediterranean where the U.S. Seventh Fleet is located. Once in the Mediterranean the oil is relatively secure and can be transported to the U.S. or other markets.

The Chairman: I remind every one that the hour is moving on.

Mr. Marples: I would not say anything more other than to agree with that statement. A key area is the Black Sea.

Turkey would like to be the dominant player in that region. I also think Turkey sees itself in close working alliance with the republics of central Asia. More and more it is going back to its traditional hostility toward Russia. I think its attitude toward Ukraine is dependent upon the relationship that Ukraine has with Russia. If Ukraine shows signs of moving away from Russian influence or in opposition to Russian policy, Turkey will be very happy with that situation.

The Chairman: As I remember my history, Catherine the Great's commander took the Crimea and most of the shore of the Black Sea from the Turks. Am I correct?

Mr. Marples: Yes, it was the Russian army that took Crimea.

The Chairman: It is interesting that it became part of Ukraine when the Russians took it from the Turks.

Senator Andreychuk: Just as a footnote, I thought that one of the reasons that the U.S. was looking to this Turkish route was to have the "stans" less under the control of the Russians. That was their position at one time. I do not know whether it still is under this administration or even under Clinton. I do know that before that it was an opportunity to break the stans reliance on Russia.

We talked about the Council of Europe and human rights and governance and democracy. One of the most troubling issues in Ukraine is the women who are being sold into the sex trade in Europe, Western Europe, Canada and the United States. This situation has caught the attention of some organizations of the United Nations. The situation is growing. It is causing disease and destruction. A slave trade has emerged which no one from Ukraine wishes to speak about. However, if you go to Kiev you do not have to be in a hotel lobby for very long before you see the transactions taking place. There are multi-lingual agents negotiat ing with Ukrainian agents over the price of young girls. These girls are looking for opportunities. Is this a growing problem in light of the economic situation?

Mr. Marples: I would say yes. The statistics indicate that the group most likely to be unemployed are women under the age of 25. That is the group that has the most difficult time finding careers. They are, as a result, susceptible to this kind of trade. It is on a mass scale. It takes place on different levels, but it is an international phenomenon. If one looks at the Internet and types in "Ukraine," you may just end up getting a list of Ukranian women trying to form partnerships with someone in the West. That is a desperate situation. The amount of socially transmitted disease in Ukraine is at a higher level than ever before. This is a key medical problem.

It is something that is completely outside the law. It is simply happening, and nothing is being done to stop it. It is happening in Russia as well. In Russia like in Ukraine this seems to be run by international groups. The women who believe that they can perhaps make enough money, in a short time, to make it worth their while. The evidence suggests that women are told one thing and experience quite another. For instance, a woman might be told that she would work in a nightclub in Tel Aviv for three months earning $1,000 a month. When the woman gets there, she finds herself in a completely different situation. They have no rights or freedom and no way to get home. They are exploited. Their passports are taken from them. Indeed, it is an endemic problem.

Mr. Klid: I agree it is a very troublesome situation. There is a very high demand for sex, even here in Canada. The Globe and Mail did an article revealing that visas were issued for women from the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine, to work as strippers in nightclubs here in Ontario. The article stated that there were also sex trade issues involved with that as well. Most of the sex trade is going on in Europe and in Israel and other countries as well. This type of illicit industry flourishes where there is an infrastructure in place that supports it.

The issue of disease is very important. AIDS is becoming a big problem and the Ukrainians, and well as the other eastern nations, need to become aware of the risks involved with that disease. They have to take the necessary measures to ensure that they minimize the risk of contacting AIDS. That is not being done. Articles written on this subject liken the problem to being like an iceberg where only the tip of the problem is being seen.

The Chairman: Honourable senators, I think it is time to end today's meeting. On your behalf, I thank our two witnesses from the University of Alberta. It has been informative and interesting.

I have one further item. Senator Bolduc had a point about procedure. Did you want to discuss that?

Senator Bolduc: We are supposed to sit every Tuesday afternoon. Last of the Tuesday, the House worked until 6 or 7 o'clock. Should we not try to find some other time? If we want to sit twice a week perhaps Thursday morning might be good.

The Chairman: I do not want to tie up our witnesses.

Senator Bolduc: On Wednesday, it usually rises around 3:30, but on Tuesday, that is different.

Senator Grafstein: Chairman, I thank Senator Bolduc for raising this again. Timing is very difficult with respect to trying to sort out various conflicts between committees and the Senate itself.

My suggestion still remains that we get a standing order from the house that we adjourn for committees when the Senate rises or at five o'clock. That allows senators to perform their house duty in the Senate. It will only interfere with those of us who sometimes have to stay longer. If we get a standing order to deal with that, it would give us at least a hour and one-half or two hours every week on Tuesday to be able to do this.

This time slot has three conflicts for me. Still, we tend to want to come here because we want to complete our important work.

Senator Andreychuk: I am not sure the leadership will agree with us rising at five. I have mentioned it on our side, and I am told that neither side is willing to do it. The committee structure is being looked at. That is always the other reason given.

One of the comments made is that if we set our meetings at six, we could bring in sandwiches or whatever and sit from six on. When they say do you agree to not see the clock, we always agree not to see the clock. However, any one of us could simply say no and force the committees to sit at six o'clock.

The Chairman: We have some news on that front.

Senator Corbin: I was quite elated with the meetings we had on Monday. If the situation is such that we can only comfortably meet once a week, why not look forward to another full Monday sometime in early June.

Senator Di Nino: This is a major issue for the whole Senate. As you know, the Standing Committee on Privileges, Standing Rules and Orders is now dealing with this issue. If we want to participate in debates in the Senate, it becomes nearly impossible if we are going to be sitting at 3:00 or 3:30 on Tuesday. On Wednesday, as you know, the Senate rises at 3:30 for the purpose of having committees meet. We have to find a solution. I do not think it is a bad idea to try Senator Grafstein's suggestion. It may not fly, but I think it is a good idea. As well, during those periods of time when we have a large agenda to go through, I do not think there would be a problem to have a full day Monday meeting once a month.

The Chairman: Let me just wind this up. We had a meeting. We met on Monday from nine until four or five. All of these thoughts have gone through my mind. I have been here in Parliament for nearly 30 years and I have never seen anything like the confusion of the last two months. I think I have as much experience here as anyone. The House of Commons would collapse if they used this system. They have 16 standing committees, and they do not all sit around the House of Commons, because otherwise business would come to a halt. The committees go and meet. They have to meet.

I have written a letter on our behalf to Senator Austin of the Rules Committee. He is also a member of this committee. He knows the problem. It is really perplexing because the problem only began this session.

Senator Andreychuk: It all comes down to Senator Grafstein's point that we take too much time on procedural issues and then we run over our appointed time.

The Chairman: Let me just say one thing. I did have the agreement in my pocket yesterday, and that is why Senator Bolduc did not know we were meeting. I did not know I had an agreement. You get these things 10 minutes before they are about to happen. Your point about anyone being able to stand up and bring the place down is correct. The leadership has assured me that committees will now be allowed to meet at six o'clock. The Senate can keep sitting. I do not personally think that is good enough. The idea is we should be able to meet at five o'clock. If we met at five o'clock on Tuesday it would solve the problem. We could count on five o'clock. Tuesdays have started sitting for hours. This is all new. This is not the way the thing is supposed to operate. I have the agreement for six o'clock; I am now working on five o'clock. We have Senator Austin working on it as well as Senator Andreychuk and Senator Di Nino. There is a conflict of committees. Senator Stewart was easily able to sit on Banking, Trade and Commerce and Foreign Affairs with no conflict. Why is there all of a sudden a conflict?

Senator Corbin: I should like to seek the agreement of the committee to have appended to our proceedings the answer to a question I raised in the Senate concerning a complaint that our very first witness, the Russian economist, made with respect to the visa and passport office in Moscow. I got a comprehensive, positive, creative response to that, and I feel it should be part of our record. I do not have it with me now, but with the committee's agreement, I will leave it with the clerk.

The Chairman: Agreed. That will become part of our record.

(For text of document, see appendix, p. 9A:1)

Senator Di Nino: Can you send it around to all the members?

Senator Grafstein: There is only one way to solve this problem. With all due respect, I sit on the Rules Committee, as does Senator Di Nino. From time to time, others come. Senator Austin is the chairman of the committee. Regretfully, that agenda is so clogged now with items, it will be difficult to deal with some of the fundamental issues. We just had another reference to that committee today. My suggestion is that there is a conflict of attitude between the leadership on both sides as to when it is appropriate for committees to sit. This becomes embarrassing when witnesses that are called from across the country arrive here only to find that the committee is cancelled.

The Chairman: At a cost of some thousands of dollars.

Senator Grafstein: My suggestion, chairman, is that if you are not able to get a satisfactory response from the leadership on both sides, we move a motion in the Senate and have a debate in the Senate, to see if we can get a five o'clock time frame for this committee during our busy period. I leave that to the steering committee. However, I would like to have this discussed at our next meeting. I think it is important that we move on with this agenda. We have a clogged agenda with lots of material, and time is running out.

The Chairman: We all agree, but it is important that we talk about it and figure out how to get out of this. Thank you very much.

The committee adjourned.

---