Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 16 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Tuesday, November 6, 2001
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 6:20 p.m. to examine and report on emerging political, social, economic and security developments in Russia and Ukraine; Canada's policy and interests in the region; and other related matters.
Senator Peter A. Stollery (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, we have been attempting to hear from Dr. Magocsi on this important subject. He is the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto and the author of a very well-received book on Ukraine and the history of Ukraine, and also a couple of atlases. The one that I own is The Boundaries of East Central Europe, which I believe is into a second edition.
Honourable senators, Dr. Magocsi is here to assist us in our study of Russia and Ukraine, which we have been at for some time. As we know, if it had not been for the events in New York in September, we would either be in Ukraine or just coming back at this point. As it is, our plan is to travel in the spring.
Dr. Magocsi, please proceed with your presentation, but be sure to leave us sufficient time for questions afterwards.
Dr. Paul Magocsi, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto: Honourable senators, as a footnote, somewhat related to one theme that I would like to share with you today, in terms of my scholarly work something that is not only related to the theme but related to this country, and all of you should know about an encyclopaedia of Canada's peoples that I formulated and published a few years ago, a massive 1,500 page volume that deals with all the peoples of Canada. You will see how it is related to what I want to say today.
It is my understanding from Senator Stollery that when this committee first began, he wanted me to be one of the first witnesses since my training and my experience and my work is basically historical in nature. I know that you have been having meetings and hearing witnesses of various kinds during the past several months. You have heard a lot about various aspects of Ukraine, Russia and countries of the former Soviet Union. I am not here to provide any contemporary political analysis. I have some insights into the society, but I would not suggest that that is my forte. I am sure that you have heard about those kinds of things from other witnesses.
I would like to share with you my thoughts on Ukraine and its nationalities.
Let me begin by suggesting that Ukraine is a normal country. What do I mean by a "normal" country? What I mean is related to what I call the 6,000-to-200 principle.
To explain that principle, there are 6,000 to 8,000 distinct cultures and peoples throughout the world with distinct languages. The figure varies depending on definition of "language" and "culture." Yet, today, and throughout most of modern history, there are no more than 200 states. I use the words "people" and "culture" interchangeably.
In the vast majority of states in the world there is more than one nationality living within the boundaries. I speak not only of immigrant countries like Canada, the United States and Australia, but of countries that have had indigenous populations, often very distinct from one another, living in those territories, for hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of years.
This may sound like a simple proposition, but it is one that educational systems worldwide very rarely encounter. We are taught from youth and continue to maintain in our minds that the world is divided into states and that states are primary. Very rarely do we realize that within states there are various peoples. That is because we are taught that all the inhabitants of a given state are of a single nationality. We are taught that all the people in France are French or all the people in Italy are Italian. There are very few states in the world, with the exception of Iceland and perhaps a few other islands, that are uni-national. It is in that sense that Ukraine is a normal country.
One of the themes of my remarks today will be that in contrast to many other issues that Ukraine has dealt with during its brief ten years of independence, Ukraine is a relative success story. First, as a multinational country, only roughly 73 per cent of its inhabitants are of Ukrainian ethno-national background. Therefore, more than one-quarter of its population is comprised of a different nationality. Of that one-quarter, 22 per cent are Russian. The other 3 per cent is a host of other nationalities, including Jews, Belarussians, Moldavians, Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians, et cetera.
When Ukraine was considering independence during the last years of the Soviet regime, there were dire predictions that if the Soviet Union should collapse, implode or become divided Ukraine would be transformed into a massacre. It was predicted that the Yugoslav conflicts would be like a Sunday picnic compared to what would happen in Ukraine because of the enormous tensions between Russians and Ukrainians, and even between Ukrainians and Poles, although there is a much smaller number of Poles.
All those dire predictions proved to be completely without substance. The one instance of potential conflict, which was more of an administrative or territorial nature than of an ethno-linguistic nature, was Crimea, and it was also resolved. The Crimean Tartars, who are only a small element within that territory, found themselves in a much more favourable position in independent Ukraine than they had in the former Soviet Union.
Ukraine leaders at the time were still under the fervour of the democratic and liberal views that had inspired many thinkers and activists throughout all of East Central Europe and Eastern Europe in the wake of 1989. This occurred despite the fact that Ukrainian relations with various nationalities, in particular Russians and Poles, were not necessarily always favourable.
There was the experience of World War II with the liquidation of a very high percentage of a Jews who had been living in large numbers in the Ukraine. Many liberal thinkers, activists and writers hoped to overcome those aspects of the historical past in which there had been conflict, hatred or friction by implementing a wide range of laws. There was the declaration of rights of the Ukrainian nationalities in 1991 and a law on national minorities in Ukraine in 1992. In 1998, Ukraine signed the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities as part of the Council of Europe.
Article 3 (1) of that framework convention states:
Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice.We all know that laws can be passed with the best intentions in mind. This applies to societies like Canada, as well as to any other society. However, there can be a great difference between the letter of the law and its implementation.
In the case of the relationship of the government of Ukraine to the various nationalities that make up the country, the practice has in large measure fulfilled the liberal nature of those laws.
Aside from not discriminating against any individual because of his or her national, ethnic or religious background, government support in the form of funding for cultural organizations, newspapers and theatres to preserve and promote the cultures of these various peoples is part of the Ukrainian budget.
The activity of a government, the passing of laws and the implementation of them, does not necessarily work unless there is a favourable atmosphere amongst the society as a whole. People may still act in a prejudicial manner regardless of what the laws are and what attempts governments make to enforce those laws.
Generally, we have not seen, in Ukraine since independence the kinds of activities that we have witnessed in some neighbouring countries, not only Russia to the east, but also in East Central Europe, where there have been open attacks against the Roma population, the gypsies, and where there have been from time to time covert or open anti-Semitic activity. These kinds of activities have not been commonplace in Ukraine.
This may sound paradoxical, but in some ways it is a reflection of the tradition of Soviet times. For all the negative features of the Soviet Union the Soviets drilled home a sense of brotherhood and love for the various peoples that comprised the Soviet Union. From the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist ideology, any hatred or discomfiture between various nationalities was a function of bourgeois, imperialist social systems that would "naturally" be overcome in a socialist environment. This ideology was drilled into western Ukraine for close to 40 years in western Ukraine and 70 years in eastern Ukraine. The attitude did rub off.
People who have been sovietized do not think first about national distinctions and hence do not judge people on those grounds. These are the things that have contributed to the positive sense of the relations between nationalities.
I do not want to speak only of the positive nature of Ukraine. We know there are other problems. This is an area in which I have some expertise. It just happens to be a positive aspect of post-communist, independent Ukraine. One should look at the positive aspects as well as the negative aspects.
However, even in this area of positiveness, there is an exception, a quirk. There has to be, because otherwise this society would not continue to be normal. Nothing can be perfect.
There is one area of Ukraine where there is a degree of discrimination. In the far western Ukraine there is a territory called Trans-Carpatha. This was the last territory to be annexed to what was then Soviet Ukraine in 1945, a territory, which was annexed from Czechoslovakia after World War II. Since 1989, in the period of democratization where people could speak their minds on a whole host of things, there was a percentage of the indigenous east Slavic population who felt that they represented a distinct nationality, Rusyn, the people of Ruse. They had been officially identified administratively by the Stalinist regime not as a distinct nationality but as part of the Ukrainian nationality. They had no choice but to accept this during the entire Soviet period. However, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, a significant number of these people began to promote the view that they were not Ukrainian, that they are part of a separate nationality, and that therefore they should have the rights of other national minorities within Ukraine.
The law regarding national minorities in Ukraine is very liberal. However, the Ukraine government itself decides what a national minority is. In the case of this area and this population, Ukraine refused to recognize Rusyns as a distinct nationality. This has caused problems because this territory is on the border of Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, and in those countries as well as in the Czech Republic, this nationality is recognized as distinct.
This is an exception to the rule of positive relations between the national minorities and the various nationalities living in Ukraine. Why is this issue even important? It is important considering that 25 per cent of the population is not Ukrainian. If one wants to build a stable civil society, relations between nationalities has to be, it not always positive, at least without friction. I believe that, at least in this regard, this is one of the success stories of Ukrainian independence during the past ten years.
Those are my opening remarks.
The Chairman: In Ukrainian politics, it seems to me that there are two Ukraines: Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia. Galicia has been part of Ukraine only since 1940. Does this affect Ukrainian politics?
I have heard it said that much of the Ukrainian government comes from Dnipropetrovs'k in Dnieper, Ukraine. What is the effect on Ukrainian government of these two very different areas with different pasts?
Dr. Magocsi: Mr. Chairman you are well prepared, because the question focuses on the heart of the matter. This is something I say to my students all the time. Right now I am teaching a seminar on the national revival in the 19th century, but this applies to the twentieth century as well.
Whenever one speaks of Ukraine, one must immediately stop speaking in the global sense. One must make it clear and specify whether one is speaking in terms of western Ukraine or eastern Ukraine. Why is that the case?
Since the late 18th century Ukraine has been politically divided. During this period eastern Ukraine was part of the Tsarist Russian empire; western Ukraine, which consists of historic territories such as Galicia and Trans-Carpathia, was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. There was a profound difference between the historical experience in the Austro-Hungarian empire and in the Russian empire.
The Russian empire was an autocratic state; all power rested with the Tsar. The Austrian empire also began as an autocratic state but was transformed into a constitutional monarchy. By 1848, Austria had its first parliament. That experiment lasted only a year or so, but by 1861 it had a parliament once again. Since 1861, Ukrainians living within the Austrian Empire have been part of the democratic process. From 1861 until World War I there were many Ukrainian members of parliament. The people of this area had a long experience working in a parliamentary system. There was the rule of law in the Austrian empire and a whole host of organizational facilities. It was very similar, in a sense, to some aspects of the democratic societies in the 20th century.
This was entirely different in the Russian empire, where by the 1860s the Ukrainian language was banned. It was forbidden to publish or to teach in Ukrainian. In the Austro-Hungarian empire Ukrainian was taught right from elementary grades right through to university.
Another important difference was religion. In Western Ukraine, people were Greek Catholic; they belonged to an Eastern Christian church that at some point had come into union with Rome. It is referred to as Greek Catholic today and in Canada we refer to it as Ukrainian Catholic. In the United States, it is referred to as Byzantine Catholic. These people recognized the Pope even though they maintained their Eastern Christian traditions.
In eastern Ukraine in the former Russian empire, they remained Orthodox. Why is this a difference? The Orthodox religion was part of the Eastern world of a true patriarchal society; a world in which the church was subordinate to the state, a world in which the mysticism of religion and the non-rational aspects of thought were predominant. In western Ukraine, which had been brought into the Catholic realm, priests and young people were sent to modern universities, trained by the Jesuits or not, and the thought processes were entirely different.
Aside from the political differences between eastern Ukraine under Russian rule and western Ukraine under Austrian rule, there was a religious and psychic difference that has remained until the present.
In western Ukraine under Austria the Ukrainian language was legal, Ukrainian organizations were legal, and political activists functioned openly as Ukrainians. It was in the Austro-Hungarian Empire that the Ukrainian national movement was the strongest. By World War I, people in western Ukraine had a sense of who they were in terms of their national identity.
That whole process, which took place in the second half of the 19th century, did not exist at all in the Russian empire, where the Ukrainian language was banned and where the vast majority of people thought they were somehow little Russians, or a branch of the Russian nationality. That mentality remains today. The heart of Ukrainian national activity and sense of Ukrainian distinctiveness is in western Ukraine, primarily in Galicia, where you have a much more passive attitude toward one's national identity than in eastern Ukraine.
That is the tension that exists today. There is a dichotomy between the two halves of the country, and I hope I have clarified that situation from the historical perspective as to why that difference exists.
Senator Andreychuk: I will leave religion aside, because I think that would get us sidetracked. I have some differences with what you say on that.
We have had some witnesses tell us that if Ukraine is to survive peacefully as an independent state, it will depend on political leaders knowing the kinds of balances they must make. We recently heard a witness who said that the present-day leadership understands that it has to gain credibility in all sectors of the country. I want to know whether you share the opinion that the present-day leaders are beginning to understand how one must worry about regions for survival.
If you ask someone in eastern Ukraine, or Crimea, who they identify with, they would say the Russian language and some of the Russian experiences. However, if you ask if that means they want to move closer to Russia or into Russia, they adamantly say "no." They identify their distinctiveness from other parts of Ukraine, but they identify with staying together. That was particularly significant of Crimea, where we hear of so many other stories.
What do you believe is the glue that will keep Ukraine together? You rightly pointed out that the laws and the administration of those laws ensures a place for minorities and that there is a distinction made about the state encompassing minorities as well as the majority group. Are there any other things that keep that country together?
Dr. Magocsi: There was a long and heated debate concerning the need for new leaders to be sensitive and responsive to the various parts of the country. One reason it took so long for a constitution to be formulated in Ukraine is because the debate, for the most part, circled around what kind of country Ukraine was to become. Should it be a central state or a federal state? There were proponents on both sides.
In the end, I believe that it was out of step with the trend in Europe. It accepted the centralist model, rather than the federal model, and then tried to backtrack a bit by giving a certain degree of rights to regions, but that has never really worked itself out.
With regard to future leaders, there is a difference also in terms of the age cohort between leadership. The views of people under the age of 40 are very different than the older generation. The younger group who began their educational careers under the Soviets and finished them in post-Communist times have a very different idea of how society should function. They have a greater degree of tolerance for various national and regional differences than the elder group.
The programs that Canada runs assisting in education, parliamentary reform, and so on are probably the best things that can be done for Ukraine. They expose young people in Ukraine to the kind of leadership that will be sensitive to and understanding of the differences within their country.
The 22 per cent living in the eastern part of the country are Russians. It was assumed that these Russians would either not want to be part of Ukraine or would be a long-term fifth column for Russia. Russia, of course, began to speak in the post-Communist era of the so-called "Russia abroad," using the same terminology that the Czarists used before World War I. Among the Russians abroad were all those territories inhabited by ethnic Russians that somehow had a special relationship with the rest of Russia.
The 22 per cent in eastern Ukraine identify themselves as Russian. There is still a large number of ethnic Ukrainians who use Russian as their daily language. Therefore, there are those who identify themselves as Russian and speak Russian and those who identify themselves as Ukrainian and speak Russian. Neither of those groups, as Senator Andreychuk correctly pointed out, is interested in becoming part of Russia.
They have been living on that territory since at least the 18th century, and in some cases even longer. They are the indigenous population of that area. They are not about to go anywhere. They will not pick up and go to Russia and they are not particularly interested in having Russia take over that part of Ukraine.
Therefore, I do not think that is really an issue.
The final question was what is the glue that will bind the country together. I do not want this answer to sound flippant, but in some ways one of the glues that will help to hold the society together is inertia. Most humans do not like change of any kind, and for the residents who live in these societies change in the short-term and often in the long-term, has never brought any improvement. Therefore, why change?
The other glue that will help to hold Ukraine together is the world community. States generally do not want other states to disappear or to change, which is a problem for national minorities or nationalities that may be suffering under an existing state. We know that, even in the latter years of the Soviet Union, the United States and even Canada were against the break-up of the Soviet Union. They were certainly against the break-up of Yugoslavia. Aside from the internal inertia, that external factor will help to keep the country together.
There is one other thing. Ukrainians have been quite successful in holding their country together precisely because of a characteristic that we generally do not like, and that is their indecisiveness. Sometimes when you run a government, no decision is the best decision. Ukrainian government has come to be a specialist in this.
Senator Austin: Dr. Magocsi, I would like to turn your attention in a different direction. We heard evidence concerning the interests, training, background and focus of Ukrainian economic growth. One witness said that there is no culture in the Ukrainian community for business and that it has to be learned from the beginning.
Senator Andreychuk: He was talking about Ukrainian Canadians.
Senator Austin: He was also talking about the culture from which they came.
How would you describe the growth of the economic culture of Ukraine?
Dr. Magocsi: When Ukraine first became independent and both Canada and the U.S. wanted to know what they could do to assist the new country. Canada, because of its long-term special relationship with Ukraine and in large part because of the significant number of Ukrainians within the country was prepared to help in any way possible.
I thought the best thing to do was to buy millions of sets of Monopoly and make sure that every young child got a set and learned how to play this game. How have we learned the value of a dollar and what an investment is? How have we even learned what the word "mortgage" means? You learned it when you were between 5 and 12, playing this game.
Ukrainian society has never had that experience. How do you teach that? You do not really teach that to adults in university, and certainly not to people in government. You cannot teach people in government anything.
You could have newspapers routes, because that was the other way that we as young children learned about the value of a dollar or the value of a penny. A paper route taught you about money.
Some parts of Ukraine and some people in Ukraine are doing very well in business. This holds true particularly in western Ukraine, because under both Austrian and Polish rule there was the cooperative movement. People learned and passed down how to set up cooperatives and credit unions, et cetera. That attitude still remains. There are some successful businesses and private restaurants, among other things. Certainly the people along the border areas have been experts throughout life. If you live next to a border, you learn quickly how to get products and how to sell them.
I was on a delegation with a group of people from Austria on a research project funded by an Austrian bank in Ukraine. Some people said the big problem in Ukraine today is the tax law structure. That must be changed, because the way it exists now, everyone is a criminal. You cannot pay your taxes. You cannot function, otherwise. Reform must come from above. This person said that if we leave the people alone and they will establish a market economy at the grassroots level.
Senator Grafstein: I have always been fascinated with one issue in the Ukraine. I have travelled there, and I spent some time studying Romania and Moldova, and I have spent some time trying to understand the underlying elements.
I found a common theme in Romania as well, which I want to address. You mentioned that civic loyalties were multiple loyalties. I want to deal with that thesis, because I have never seen it developed so well. It is quite interesting.
I have always wondered why there has not been what I call a small "L" liberal impulse in Ukraine. Let me give you some comparisons. In Poland, despite the conflicts in the feudal system between the cities and the landlords; between the governments; and between the various loyalties to Lithuania and the adjacencies, there was always a liberal impulse. Some people adopted the Western idea of pluralism and promoted it. That culminated in the independence of Poland in 1921.
We saw the same in Czechoslovakia and in Central Europe. There was always a mainstream minority that adopted the pluralistic idea of equality and, around that, a national identity was built.
I am searching for the reason why there has not been a strong small "L" liberal impulse that has emerged. Is it a fair analysis to say that it has not emerged? We have not seen it in the modern-day government other than in small groups.
Senator Austin mentioned the economic model and the need to learn to do business. At the intellectual level, you need people, intellectuals at least, who are prepared to lobby for the liberal impulse. In Russia, too, there was a liberal impulse, and it still exists.
Dr. Magocsi: Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, there were certainly individuals in various parts of Ukraine, both east and west that one could identify as small "L" liberal. There are individuals like that in most European societies. The issue is the critical mass or the number of them. You need more than just a few.
Senator Grafstein: Exactly.
Dr. Magocsi: Now we move on to the next issue of why there are relatively fewer such individuals in Ukraine than there are in some of the other countries that you have mentioned. When you live and work in this part of Europe the farther east you go, the worse everything gets.
This is applicable for France vis-à-vis Alsace, for Germany vis-à-vis the eastern part of Germany, and for the Czech lands vis-à-vis Slovakia. I say that because there were probably a higher percentage of these small "L" liberals in the western part of Ukraine precisely because of the Austrian Hapsburg constitutional monarchic experience. Again, this was probably not the case as much as for the neighbouring Poles, and certainly not as much as for the neighbouring Czechs, but it diminishes the further east you go.
I feel comfortable reiterating that there is a difference between the orthodox world and the Western Christian world. All of this may sound far-fetched to a highly secular society such as ours, but there are deep differences in the way people think and act when they come from traditional societies and the main concern of the vast majority of people is their religious life.
The Eastern Christian world simply never had exposure to rational thought. They never experienced that world; they never had a renaissance. As a result, awareness of and sympathy for other truths was never inculcated in that world, except for that very small number of small "L" liberals that you could count on the fingers of one hand.
I suggest that this Eastern cultural tradition is in large measure one of the reasons for these differences. The higher the degree to which people have been exposed to Western intellectual principles and educational systems, the greater number of liberals there will be. The University of L'viv in Western Ukraine was a first-rate educational institution in the second-half of the nineteenth century. This was not the case with institutions farther east.
Senator Grafstein: I part company with your analysis that in Ukraine there is not an indigenous, genetic or inculcated business ethic. When we examine the period from 1880 to 1914, we discover that the Ukraine had developed one of the greatest agricultural exporting businesses in the world. The quality of its production was superb. Its wheat was superb. They had developed mechanisms for transportation and export. In fact, they produced the most wheat of any country in the world. In 1910, the Ukraine was producing and exporting more wheat, on a qualitative basis, than was Canada in 1970.
There was a methodology indigenous to Ukraine that developed world-class, competitive agricultural products. How did it happen and why did it disappear?
Dr. Magocsi: When we discuss the wheat industry, we are talking about a government policy of the Russian empire. The industry did not grow from natural roots. The Russian imperial government needed funds to underwrite its industrial development, and it got those funds by exporting wheat to Europe. It was government policy imposed from above, and it worked well.
Senator Bolduc: I am surprised, because most of the time it does not work.
Dr. Magocsi: In this case it worked.
Senator Grafstein: They were great farmers.
Dr. Magocsi: Yes, and there is another reason. Some of the most productive farmers in eastern Ukraine during that time were Catholic and Protestant Germans, and Mennonite farmers who were brought there as part of Russian policy to open up and settle these lands and to make them productive.
The farmers produced the wheat and the government exported it to the Black Sea and sold it. Most of the eastern Slavic population was not part of the process, other than for raw labour.
With regard to a business ethic not existing in Ukraine, I would again have to say that the dichotomy between East and West does apply. I reiterate that the cooperative movement in western Ukraine, and in Galicia in particular, trained people to work in the business world.
How is it possible that the large number of immigrants of Ukrainian background who came to Canada, primarily from Galicia, were enormously successful business people? Did they learn this from living in Canada? That helped a bit, but they brought a lot of that experience with them from Galicia. Without that, they would not have been successful. They recreated their cooperatives, cultural organizations and so forth in this country. And they did it without interference from the state. However, I am not certain that there is not a natural business ethic in some parts of Ukraine.
Finally, we know that in eastern Ukraine most of the German population was driven out during the period of anarchy of World War I. Then, under the Soviets, there was a direct policy of eliminating the most successful of farmers. They were all branded as Kulaks and exploiters and were sent away. The government eliminated that portion of the agricultural population who did have some talent in the business world. They tried to do the same thing in Western Ukraine but there they had only 40 years instead of 70 years. That is why there is more memory of business practice in Western Ukraine than in Eastern Ukraine.
Senator Grafstein: And that instruction was led by Ukrainian Bolsheviks?
Dr. Magocsi: The locals did just as much. I said the Soviet system, not say the Russians.
Senator Bolduc: Could you say a few words about the legal system in both parts of the country? This is important to know in terms of cultural perspective. If you have a code that says that the convention is the law of the parties that gives people freedom of speech instead of being regulated by the government.
I say that because I see that in other types of trade. As they were successful in wheat, they were also very successful in violins. Most of the great violinists came from this area. That is quite impressive.
Senator Andreychuk: And writers.
Dr. Magocsi: I am not familiar enough with the history of law to adequately say anything other than superficialities, so I will pass on that question.
The Chairman: I want to pursue the difference between Orthodoxy and Catholic Europe. Dr. Magocsi, you have given us the best explanation so far. Would you expand on that? It is an important aspect of the society that we are trying to understand.
Dr. Magocsi: Scholars have spoken about Slavia Orthodoxa or Slavia Romana. Slavia Orthodoxa is that part of the Slavic world that was and remained Eastern Christian. Slavia Romana is the part of the Slavic world that became Roman Catholic.
If you are talking about Slavia Orthodoxa, or the Eastern Christian world, you are talking about a tradition that from the very beginning the church was subordinate to the state. It was based on the Byzantine model. The church was an instrument of the state. The Soviets did not create this condition. They continued a condition that existed during the Russian empire, which in turn took it from the Byzantine empire.
Eastern Christian thought never had the rational, logical tradition of training for its priests. Even seminaries came very late in the Eastern Christian world. Faith itself was ultimate. There was no need to convince people of their religious convictions. You either had them or you did not have them. You did not need basic educational institutions, let alone higher-level ones. For instance, the first universities in the Russian empire were not created until the 18th century, whereas throughout Europe the universities had been establish from as early as the 12th century.
In 1595 a small area of Ukraine was brought into the Catholic realm. One of the first things they did was train the seminarians either in Rome or in Catholic Jesuit schools. There the seminarians were given a broad exposure to universal knowledge, which is something that the Eastern Orthodox world was not even remotely thinking about.
Because of that, we had a significant difference between thought patterns in Western Ukraine and in Eastern Ukraine, which exists to this day.
Senator Prud'homme: You are right when you say that Canada has always been against the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. You know Canada sufficiently well to know that any split of any country makes people in Ottawa nervous. It may not be for the right reasons that Ottawa was against the split of the Soviet Union. It was because it reminded them that we have a federal system that can be very fragile. Regardless of recent elections in Quebec, it is still, very fragile. Anything could still happen, even though my colleagues believe now that everything is okay. I do not share their opinion.
I had the honour of going for Minister of Foreign Affairs André Ouellet to supervise the first and second elections in Ukraine. I was invited to speak and was the first foreigner in the Parliament of Ukraine. I do not hide that I have a great love for Slav people, both in Ukraine and in Russia.
Do you think that Canada should have a look at its immigration policy?
As you know, because of the paranoia of the Cold War, we cut ourselves off from an immigration base. If you go across Canada, especially to Western Canada, you have all the institutions prepared but dying out.
When I arrived here 38 years ago, Ukrainians made up the third largest community in Canada. I do not think it now counts as one of the 10 largest communities.
Do you not think that we need massive immigration in Canada? You could recommend that in your study. Your understanding, your travelling and your writing have impressed me very much. Perhaps you can have a look at how Canada can revitalize, replenish, or any other word you may have in English.
[Translation]
In French, we would talk about renewing this "bastion" of immigration that we have.
[English]
The reason is very simple. We have institutions already there, credit unions, churches and so on. However, they are dying out, as they are in the Eastern countries that we cut ourselves off from for the last 50 years.
Is there something there that the committee may look into?
The Chairman: You may have difficulty answering that question because the question really deals with the mandate of the committee.
Senator Prud'homme: Yes, it is.
[Translation]
Mr. Magocsi: For seven years, I was the director of the Ontario Institute for Multiculturalism. So I am aware of these problems not only from a historical point of view, but also from a contemporary policy perspective in Canada.
On one hand, when the government consulted the public on immigration policy in Canada, I must tell you that as director of such an institute, I opposed Canada's immigration policy, especially at a time when unemployment was high in the country. Accepting immigrants before taking care of the people's needs here did not seem logical.
Moreover, I thought it was unfair to invite immigrants to Canada where they had no chance of finding work in their fields. Canada has often played the role of a country of immigrants. We can accept everyone because we are very liberal. Accepting immigrants is one thing, taking care of them is another.
Some immigrant communities, like the Ukrainian community in the central provinces of Canada, are dying off. That is another matter. What type of immigrants does the country want? We had a tradition of accepting immigrants from Europe instead of other countries in the world. That tradition began in the 19th century and continued for the first half of the 20th century. However, the tradition has changed. I do not know how this committee can play a role in that area.
The Chairman: That is not in our mandate, and Senator Prud'homme knows that. Having been a member of Parliament in Toronto for ten years, I am quite familiar with immigration in the metropolitan centre.
[English]
Senator Bolduc: I suspect that you are familiar with the Canadian International Development Agency programs in Ukraine. Do you agree with the types of orientation that we have, and if you do not, how would you suggest we improve them? One of our mandates is to present propositions to the government.
Dr. Magocsi: To the degree that I am familiar with that agency, it seems to be terribly bureaucratized. If one wants to get something done, there are so many hoops to jump through that serious people do not want to waste their time to undertake a program through them.
On the other hand, such programs should continue, to the degree that they help to expose people in Ukraine to the way in which the democratic system works here. We should continue to send lecturers there and also continue bringing people here, especially if the emphasis is on young people.
The Chairman: The steering committee has been discussing the whole question of unexpected crises. Should we prepare for unexpected crises?
Dr. Magocsi: I would say we are in for a period of extended boredom, a period in which there will not be much change. That will be the biggest challenge, because societies, countries and foreign powers very often only react to crises. It is difficult to react on a long-term basis.
The work of your committee is an example of long-term reaction despite the fact that there may not be any overwhelming crises in this part of the world. There are economic problems, but I do not think there will be anything in this part of the word that we need to be concerned about for some period of time.
The Chairman: That is extremely interesting. You pointed out how things have changed in a year but not long ago, Russia had security issues. We were in Brussels at NATO; there were security questions. Those have just evaporated in a fairly short period of time.
Senator Grafstein: Just back to the question of a threat, is there a foreseeable security threat either regionally or internationally?
There is a huge battle going on in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania. It is a frozen conflict. People hope that it will not explode. In the southeast there is the Crimean question and the oil question. Does that not suggest to you a future problem in that area in terms of being an international or regional threat?
Dr. Magocsi: It does not suggest an international threat. These areas are small. First, a conflict of that kind, even if it is in eastern Moldova or the Trans-Dnistrian Republic, will be a contained matter. It will continue to simmer, but I cannot see it spreading far, and I would say the same with regard to farther east as well.
It is hard to know what we are talking about here.
The Chairman: We are not talking about the Caucasus.
Dr. Magocsi: Again, I feel uncomfortable speaking in prophetic terms but you have asked the question and I see no crises of that kind.
The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Magocsi. This has been very interesting.
The committee adjourned.