Honourable senators, before I comment on Bill C-44, I would like to reassure Senator Day and all my colleagues that my speaking notes come from my office and are based on my analysis of all the feedback we collected so far, including what we heard from officials at the Department of Justice, Transport Canada and the Department of Finance. I wrote them objectively, based on my extensive experience offering constructive criticism on government bills in Quebec.

I believe that much of what has been said in the course of our deliberations on this omnibus bill, and on all omnibus bills, warrants clarification.

An omnibus bill is a tool available to the government and to parliamentarians that helps them improve the legislative process and expedite the implementation of programs that will benefit Canadians. At the same time, it is a tool that requires a great deal of vigilance, because it is true that with omnibus bills comes the risk that the legislator could be tempted to quickly pass certain initiatives that can be easily hidden in the bill because of the sheer number of pages.

I would like to point out, however, that the section of Bill C-44 dealing with the Canada infrastructure bank is 12 pages long and is no more succinct than it would have been in a specialized bill on that bank alone. Also, the provisions required to create such a bank would not have been any different, in my opinion. I wanted to add that to my remarks, because I think that a lot urban legends exist around that subject.

My comments on Bill C-44 will focus essentially on the Canada infrastructure bank. I really wanted to speak to this because the National Assembly of Quebec unanimously adopted a motion calling on us to ensure that the jurisdictions of Quebec, all the provinces and the municipal regulations authorities are respected. I will come back to that.

Honourable senators, Canada's infrastructure is in desperate need of attention. Estimates range from $570 billion to $1 trillion. The need is too significant for us to use a traditional approach to funding infrastructure. The Canada infrastructure bank is an innovative solution to minimize the risk and pressure on public funding in the current climate. That is the goal. Much concern was expressed over this new Crown corporation and I intend to address what seem to be the thorniest issues.

The Canada infrastructure bank act states in subclause 5(4) of Division 18, Part 4, that the bank will not be an agent of the Crown. This point caused a great deal of misunderstanding in this chamber, but it is a precautionary provision. It indicates that the federal government will not automatically endorse transactions that the bank takes part in. As advocates for taxpayers, we should applaud this provision.

Many people raised concerns over paragraph 5(4)(d). This provision would give the federal government the power to decree, as it sees fit, certain partners as agents of the Crown with all the privileges and immunities that this status entails, including from a tax perspective. I followed this specific issue quite closely because some legitimate concerns were raised over respect for shared constitutional jurisdictions.

The Canada infrastructure bank will not be an agent of the Crown except under the circumstances set out in paragraphs 5(4) (a) to (d). These exceptions are essentially limited to the bank's dealings with the public administration and the federal government. That is critical, since neither the infrastructure projects nor the bank's private partners will be given any exemptions, privileges or immunity that are specific only to an agent of the Crown. That means that all federal and provincial statutes will apply to the projects that the bank participates in. It is important to emphasize and take note of that.

It is important to understand that agent of the Crown status can be granted in only two ways: it can be expressly granted by law to an organization or a legal person established in the public interest, or in the absence of such a legislative provision, it can be granted by an examination of the organization's connection to the government in terms of the functions it carries out or who controls its budget, administration and policies. As a result, a private company could not be given such immunity unless it can prove that it is truly acting as an agent of the Crown, something that cannot be assumed. It seems unlikely that such a situation would arise given the organizational structure and the primary objective of optimizing the returns of private investors.

Institutional investors must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. For example, in the case of the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, an entity that acts and invests across the country, an Act respecting the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec gives this institution and its wholly owned subsidiaries the status of agent of the Crown. In contrast, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act expressly states that the board is not an agent of the Crown. However, the federal government retains some regulatory power over the board. The same is true for most other public pension funds across Canada. They generally do not have agent of the Crown status. In short, even if an organization is an agent of the Crown, it does not have complete immunity because its immunity can be limited by a law or regulation.

This information was not widely known before the National Assembly of Quebec unanimously adopted a motion on May 31. The motion affirms the application of every law in Quebec to the projects supported by the bank and calls for amendments to that effect. If this concern were not addressed, I would be the first to stand up in this chamber to demand that respect for the division of powers be enshrined in Bill C-44.

In light of the answers we got from a number of individuals, including the Minister of Finance, and from the June 5 letter from the deputy ministers of Finance and Infrastructure, I do not believe that is necessary. The minister left no room for doubt when he appeared before the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce on May 31. Here is what he said:

[T]he bank does not encroach on provincial jurisdiction. We have every certainty that this bank will be subject to municipal, provincial and federal laws. It will respect the division of powers between the provincial and federal governments. All relevant provincial and territorial laws will apply for all projects in which the bank invests. There are no special exemptions for the bank or for bank projects. We have sought counsel on this, and that is absolutely clear.

I am therefore convinced that all provincial and municipal laws, as well as municipal bylaws, will be respected and that it would be pointless to include such a provision in Bill C-44. It would create an irrelevant precedent in federal legislation and is apt to cause confusion in the interpretation of our laws. We must also take into account the presumption that every part of a statute is intended to be effective, which means that every word of a piece of legislation is meant to have a specific effect. There is a reason why the House of Commons said the bank will not be an agent of Her Majesty.

Essentially, when a company partners with the bank on an infrastructure project, it must comply with every aspect of the legislative framework, such as environmental assessments and working conditions on job sites, unless, of course, a particular law grants agent of the Crown status to an institution, such as the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec. Even for a project like the Montreal light rail system, the bank would comply with Quebec legislation, which grants specific status to the Caisse de dépôt.

Also, certain reservations were expressed about the $35-billion envelope earmarked for the bank over 12 years. I would point out that the maximum fiscal impact is limited to $15 billion for any charge added to the books in one fiscal year. The bank's equity investment in infrastructure projects could therefore not exceed the $15-billion limit.

The other $20 billion would be allocated to granting loans and loan guarantees. Those incentives would help create a competitive environment on financial markets, where the bank's partners would have to rigorously control their spending in order to reach a reasonable level of profitability to satisfy their shareholders. Ultimately, this innovative model will reduce the risk of default of payment and cost overruns for Canadian taxpayers.

Lastly, I would be remiss if I did not mention the balance inherent to the bank's structure. Future directors will be appointed to serve at pleasure by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will recommend the chief executive officer, who will ultimately be appointed by the board of directors. The board must be consulted, however, in the event of the dismissal of its chairperson or chief executive officer. This structure establishes a high standard of review relative to other similar federal Crown corporations. Indeed, some of them lack this kind of balance between institutional autonomy and government oversight.

For instance, the Business Development Bank of Canada is an agent of the Crown. The chairperson and chief executive officer are appointed at pleasure by the Prime Minister for the term designated notwithstanding the Financial Administration Act, and board members are appointed for a term of four years by the relevant minister with the Prime Minister's approval.

Second, the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation is an agent of the Crown. The chairperson and the chief executive officer are appointed at pleasure by the Prime Minister for as long as he sees fit, and board members are also appointed at pleasure for a four-year term by the minister responsible, with the Prime Minister's approval.

Third, Export Development Canada is also an agent of the Crown. The chairperson and the chief executive officer are appointed at pleasure by the Prime Minister for as long as he sees fit, and board members are also appointed at pleasure for a four- year term by the minister responsible with the Prime Minister's approval.

These examples show that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the dilemma of public governance. Nevertheless, in order to strike a structural balance that meets the highest standards, the government established that the bank would be a non-agent Crown corporation, as I described earlier.

What is more, the bank will be audited by the Auditor General of Canada without any restrictions and will be accountable to Parliament every five years by virtue of its enabling statute. These checks and balances are also consistent with best practices in public governance.

Honourable senators, given the facts and the documentation, and after carefully reviewing the sensitive issues related to the Canada infrastructure bank, I wholeheartedly support the passage of Bill C-44. Thank you.